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PREPARING FOR THE APOCALYPSE: A MULTI-PRONG
PROPOSAL TO DEVELOP COUNTERMEASURES FOR
CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, AND
NUCLEAR THREATS
Constance E. Bagley † & Anat Alon-Beck *

“Governments will always play a huge part in solving big problems. . . . They
also fund basic research, which is a crucial component of the innovation that
improves life for everyone.”
—Bill Gates 1
The false alarm of a Hawaiian nuclear attack in January 2018 is an example of
the lack of U.S. preparedness for attacks using nuclear and other weapons of mass
destruction. To address such threats, this Article proposes the establishment of a
nationwide integrated defense of health countermeasures initiative (DHCI). DHCI is
a multi-prong program to create a defensive triad comprising government, private
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1 COLLABORATIVE INNOVATION IN DRUG DISCOVERY: STRATEGIES FOR PUBLIC AND
PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS x (Rathnam Chaguturu ed., 2014) (alteration in original) [hereinafter
Chaguturu].
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industry, and academia to develop countermeasures for health threats posed by
chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) attacks. Key elements of our
proposal include the use of the government’s Other Transaction Authority to simplify
procurement arrangements, the establishment of public-private partnerships with an
information commons for the sharing and use of certain information and trusted
intermediaries to protect proprietary information pursuant to cooperative research
and development agreements, and the creation of a network of incubators sited in
ecosystems of excellence. Although our proposal focuses on health countermeasures, it
may be applied to other urgent national needs, such as rebuilding U.S. infrastructure.
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INTRODUCTION: TWO MINUTES TO THE APOCALYPSE
On January 13, 2018, the Hawaiian government sent a text to its
citizens announcing that a nuclear ballistic missile strike was imminent
and instructing residents to seek shelter. 2 It took more than thirty
minutes for the government to announce that the notice was sent in
error. Several days later, the Japanese government also sent an
erroneous notice of an imminent attack, which it corrected several
minutes later. 3 Ballistic missile tests by North Korea 4 have triggered
memories of the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, when the United States
and the Soviet Union were on the brink of nuclear war. Had the Hawaii
alert been accurate, where exactly were residents to seek shelter? Or are
we back to the days of “duck and cover?”
In 2018, the Russian government used a weapons-grade nerve
agent in an apparent attempt to assassinate a former spy and his
daughter in Britain. 5 In response, the U.K. Minister of Defence
announced that the United Kingdom was spending £48 million to set up
a chemical weapons defense center and was vaccinating thousands of
British troops against anthrax. 6

2 Adam Nagourney et al., Hawaii Panics After Alert About Incoming Missile Is Sent in
Error, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 13, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/13/us/hawaiimissile.html.
3 See Madison Malone Kircher, Japan Sends False Alert Over Impending North Korean
Missile Attack, INTELLIGENCER (Jan. 16, 2018), http://nymag.com/selectall/2018/01/japansends-false-missile-alert-about-north-korea-attack.html [https://perma.cc/THA6-LWPG].
4 See Hasani Gittens, Trump to North Korean Leader Kim: My Nuclear Button ‘Is Bigger &
More Powerful’, NBC NEWS (Jan. 2, 2018), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/donald-trump/
trump-north-korean-leader-kim-my-nuclear-button-bigger-more-n834196 [https://perma.cc/
L3W7-JUYN]; see also Lindsey Bever et al., The Doomsday Clock is Now Just 2 Minutes to
‘Midnight,’ the Symbolic Hour of the Apocalypse, WASH. POST (Jan. 25, 2018), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/news/speaking-of-science/wp/2018/01/25/after-a-missile-scare-andinsult-war-with-north-korea-its-time-to-check-the-doomsday-clock/?utm_term=
.72758f5758ad [https://perma.cc/6SCK-JG7P].
5 See Novichok: Murder Inquiry After Dawn Sturgess Dies, BBC (July 9, 2018), https://
www.bbc.com/news/uk-44760875 [https://perma.cc/U8HE-DV56]. Two more Britons were
poisoned by the same nerve agent in July 2018, causing at least one death. Id.
6 Ewen MacAskill, UK to Set Up £48m Chemical Weapons Defence Centre, GUARDIAN
(Mar. 14, 2018, 8:01 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2018/mar/15/uk-set-up-48mchemical-weapons-defence-centre-gavin-williamson [https://perma.cc/B7JB-4ENF].
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Anthrax-laced letters killed five and sickened fifteen Americans in
2001. 7 Syria used sarin gas on its own citizens in 2017 and 2013. 8 If
smallpox or other pathogens are weaponized, will we have adequate
antidotes and vaccines available? What bacteriological cures or vaccines
do we need to fight other weaponized “super bugs” or the spread of
Ebola?
The fact is that governments worldwide are woefully unprepared to
address threats of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
(CBRN) attacks and other emergency events that can cause massive
human casualties. 9 Such threats come not only from states at war using
traditional military means of delivery, but also from non-state
sponsored terrorist groups 10 and naturally occurring diseases such as
antibiotic-resistant bacteria and Ebola. Even though CBRN attacks are a

7 See Lawrence O. Gostin et al., The Model State Emergency Health Powers Act: Planning
for and Response to Bioterrorism and Naturally Occurring Infectious Diseases, 288 J. AM. MED.
ASS’N 622 (2002); Larry M. Bush et al., Index Case of Fatal Inhalational Anthrax Due to
Bioterrorism in the United States, 345 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1607, 1610 (2001), http://
www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMoa012948 [https://perma.cc/K5SU-X24E] (“Coworkers
report that the patient had closely examined a suspicious letter containing powder on
September 19, approximately eight days before the onset of illness.”); John A. Jernigan et al.,
Bioterrorism-Related Inhalational Anthrax: The First 10 Cases Reported in the United States, 7
EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 933, 933 (2001), https://wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/article/7/6/pdfs/
01-0604.pdf [https://perma.cc/YER5-MMEA] (“Epidemiologic investigation indicated that the
outbreak, in the District of Columbia, Florida, New Jersey, and New York, resulted from
intentional delivery of B. anthracis spores through mailed letters or packages.”).
8 Sarin Gas Used as Weapon in Syria, Says Chemical Weapons Watchdog, NBC NEWS (June
30, 2017, 5:44 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/sarin-gas-used-weapon-syria-sayschemical-weapons-watchdog-n778466 [https://perma.cc/9XJH-BTN6].
9 See Global Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Hearings Before the Permanent
Subcomm. on Investigations of the Comm. on Governmental Affairs U.S. S.: Part I, 104th Cong.
(1995); OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, OTA-ISC-559, PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS
DESTRUCTION: ASSESSING THE RISKS 4–5 (1993).
10 See Global Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, supra note 9; PROLIFERATION
OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION, supra note 9; see also David P. Fidler, Public Health and
National Security in the Global Age: Infectious Diseases, Bioterrorism, and Realpolitik, 35 GEO.
WASH. INT’L L. REV. 787, 817 (2003) (“The growth of terrorism as a phenomenon in
international relations has presented realism with a dilemma because terrorism’s increased
prominence suggests that (1) states do not have a monopoly on violence in international
politics, and (2) the anarchical structure of the international system is not the only source of
conflict and violence.”); Disruptive Technologies Push Bioterrorism to a Whole New Level, MED.
FUTURIST (Sept. 21, 2016), http://medicalfuturist.com/disruptive-technologies-bioterrorism
[https://perma.cc/7J9L-BBD7].
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recognized national security hazard and public health concern, 11
vaccines and therapeutics are available for only a small number of these
threats, leaving large populations in the United States and elsewhere
susceptible to such attacks. 12 Successfully addressing this threat will
require combining the “rapidly growing” and “complex [governmental]
science and technology base” 13 with the more nimble and innovative
research and development capabilities of academic and industry
scientists to speed up the adoption of the information technology
innovations necessary to address CBRN threats.
Also key to developing effective countermeasures is promoting
academic entrepreneurship 14 and translational medicine 15 by facilitating
See RICHARD A. FALKENRATH ET AL., AMERICA’S ACHILLES’ HEEL: NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL,
221–25, 228–29 (1998) (discussing concerns
about nuclear, biological, and chemical terrorist attacks in asymmetrical conflict with the
United States).
12 See HHS Public Health Emergency Medical Countermeasures Enterprise Implementation
Plan for Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Threats, 72 Fed. Reg. 20117 (Apr. 23,
2007); Jason Matheny et al., Incentives for Biodefense Countermeasure Development, 5
BIOSECURITY & BIOTERRORISM 228 (2007), http://docs.house.gov/meetings/IF/IF14/20160519/
104953/HHRG-114-IF14-20160519-SD006.pdf [https://perma.cc/3XZ8-RQCN] (“[M]edical
countermeasures are available for only a fraction of biological threats, including those
representing the highest risk, as determined by the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS)
threat assessments.”).
13 See generally NATIONAL INNOVATION SYSTEMS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 64 n.3
(Richard R. Nelson ed., 1993).
14 Constance E. Bagley & Christina D. Tvarnø, Promoting “Academic Entrepreneurship” in
Europe and the United States: Creating an Intellectual Property Regime to Facilitate the Efficient
Transfer of Knowledge from the Lab to the Patient, 26 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 1, 3 (2015). On
the different types of entrepreneurship, see Anat Alon-Beck, The Law of Social
Entrepreneurship—Creating Shared Value Through the Lens of Sandra Day O’Connor’s iCivics,
20 U. PA. J. BUS. L. (forthcoming), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3064448. See also BILL AULET &
FIONA MURRAY, MURRAY TR. CENT. FOR MIT ENTREPRENEURSHIP, A TALE OF TWO
ENTREPRENEURS: UNDERSTANDING DIFFERENCES IN THE TYPES OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN THE
ECONOMY 3–4, 7–8 (2013), https://www.kauffman.org/-/media/kauffman_org/researchreports-and-covers/2013/05/a_tale_of_two_entrepreneurs_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/23YAM5V3].
15 See John C. Reed, NCATS Could Mitigate Pharma Valley of Death, 31 GENETIC
ENGINEERING & BIOTECHNOLOGY NEWS (May 13, 2011), https://www.genengnews.com/genarticles/ncats-could-mitigate-pharma-valley-of-death/3662/?page=1
[https://perma.cc/S2PPU4GU]; see also Arti K. Rai et al., Pathways Across the Valley of Death: Novel Intellectual
Property Strategies for Accelerating Drug Discovery, 8 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 1, 4
(2008) (proposing a two-tier regime for promoting “intensive, large-scale collaboration
between academics, who possess unique skills in designing assays that can identify promising
targets, and pharmaceutical firms that hold libraries of potentially useful small molecules as
trade secrets, making them largely off limits to these same academic scientists”). One of the
11

AND CHEMICAL TERRORISM AND COVERT ATTACK
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the movement of medical research and discoveries from “bench to
bedside.” 16 The pharmaceutical industry is highly concentrated, 17 and
National Institutes of Health (NIH) programs transferred to the National Center for Advancing
Translational Sciences (NCATS) is the Molecular Libraries Probe Production Centers Network
(MLPCN), “the first federally funded network to facilitate drug discovery by producing earlystage small molecule leads.” Reed, supra. As Reed explained:
These centers, most of which reside in universities and nonprofit research institutes
across the U.S., provide federally funded researchers and even small biotechnology
companies with access to drug discovery capabilities previously found only within
large pharmaceutical companies. Those capabilities include large chemical libraries,
assay development, ultra high-throughput robotic screening, cheminformatics,
medicinal chemistry, project management, and several other drug discovery-related
services that typically don’t exist in academic labs and departments.
Id. The NCATS Pre-Clinical Research Toolbox includes multiple small molecule libraries
containing more than 100,000 small molecules generated by academic researchers. Compound
Management, NAT’L CTR. FOR ADVANCING TRANSLATIONAL SCI., https://ncats.nih.gov/
preclinical/core/compound [https://perma.cc/66MS-RVGJ] (last updated Sept. 24, 2018). These
molecules are available for researchers doing “high-throughput screening (HTS) of small
molecule libraries against assays containing target proteins to identify promising compounds
that may lead to patentable drugs.” Rai, supra, at 7.
16 See Constance E. Bagley & Christina D. Tvarnø, Pharmaceutical Public-Private
Partnerships: Moving from the Bench to the Bedside, 4 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 373, 373–74 (2014).
[G]overnments in the European Union (EU) and the United States have taken bold
steps to promote the movement of medical research and discoveries from “bench to
bedside,” from the university laboratory to the patient. This “translation from the
university laboratory to the healthcare sector [is facilitated by] the generation and
support of start-ups, spin-offs, university-industry consortia, and other platforms.”
For example, in 2014, the National Institutes of Health (NIH) in the United States
announced the $230 million Accelerating Medicines Partnership, which will bring
together scientists from ten large pharmaceutical companies, several research
foundations and nonprofit organizations, and the NIH and Food and Drug
Administration to collaborate on multi-year, open-source projects. These projects are
designed to bridge the gap between (i) cutting-edge genomics, proteomics, imaging
and other medical research, and (ii) the new drugs and diagnostics needed to fight
type 2 diabetes, Alzheimer’s disease, lupus, and rheumatoid arthritis.
Id.; see also Editorial, NIH Tries a New Approach to Speed Drug Development, WASH. POST
(Feb. 8, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/nih-tries-a-new-approach-to-speeddrug-development/2014/02/08/bf30ba18-8ea1-11e3-b227-12a45d109e03_story.html?utm_
term=.d5260b0a243f [https://perma.cc/847S-V6JZ]; Accelerating Medicines Partnership (AMP),
NAT’L
INSTS.
HEALTH,
https://www.nih.gov/research-training/accelerating-medicinespartnership-amp [https://perma.cc/3J2T-KEYX] (last visited Sept. 30, 2018); Budget, NAT’L
CTR. FOR ADVANCING TRANSLATIONAL SCI., http://www.ncats.nih.gov/about/budget/
budget.html [https://perma.cc/25G2-YNN6] (last updated Sept. 10, 2018); Alliances at NCATS,
NAT’L CTR. FOR ADVANCING TRANSLATIONAL SCI., https://ncats.nih.gov/alliances/about
[https://perma.cc/UTA6-FKFB] (last updated Sept. 10, 2018); About, EUR. FED’N FOR
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“[t]he development of new pharmaceuticals is both high risk and high
cost, 18 with new drugs costing a billion dollars or more to bring to
market.” 19
There is a critical need to establish a nationwide integrated public
health defense infrastructure, platform, and services initiative (the
Defense of Health Countermeasures Initiative, or DHCI) to address
such threats. The multi-faceted initiative for addressing the threats of
CBRN attacks we introduce in Part IV builds on the successes of the
PHARMACEUTICAL SCI., http://www.eufeps.org/about [https://perma.cc/4YZS-A4VD] (last
visited Sept 30, 2018).
17 “From 2003 to 2007, roughly 80 percent of all pharmaceutical patents granted pursuant
to the Patent Cooperation Treaty were issued to firms domiciled in just thirteen developed
countries.” Bagley & Tvarnø, supra note 16, at 377 n.24; see also Anand Grover et al.,
Pharmaceutical Companies and Global Lack of Access to Medicines: Strengthening
Accountability Under the Right to Health, 40 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 234, 238 (2012).
18 See AMERICA’S BIOPHARMACEUTICAL RESEARCH COS., INFECTIOUS DISEASES: A REPORT
ON DISEASES CAUSED BY BACTERIA, VIRUSES, FUNGI AND PARASITES 46 (2013); Matheny et al.,
supra note 12, at 229 tbl.1. (titled R&D Process for a Typical New Drug); Christopher P. Adams
& Van V. Brantner, Estimating the Cost of New Drug Development: Is It Really $802 Million?, 25
HEALTH AFF. 420 (2006); Joseph A. DiMasi et al., The Price of Innovation: New Estimates of
Drug Development Costs, 22 J. HEALTH ECON. 151 (2003); Ismail Kola & John Landis, Can the
Pharmaceutical Industry Reduce Attrition Rates?, 3 NATURE REVS. DRUG DISCOVERY 711
(2004).
19 Bagley & Tvarnø, supra note 16, at 379 (citing Valerie Gutmann Koch, Incentivizing the
Utilization of Pharmacogenetics in Drug Development, 15 J. Health Care L. & Pol’y 263, 274
n.89, 276 (2012) (citing data showing that only 1 out of 60,000 compounds created by drug
companies are highly successful, roughly 1 out of 6 drugs put into clinical trials are ultimately
approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), and more than 3% of drugs approved
by the FDA are subsequently withdrawn due to negative side effects); PHARM. RESEARCH &
MFRS. OF AM., PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY: 2011 PROFILE 10 (2011); Koch, supra, at 274 n.87
(citing Donald W. Light & Rebecca Warburton, Demythologizing the High Cost of
Pharmaceutical Research, 6 BIO-SCIENCES 34, 36, 38–39 (2011)); ALFONSO GAMBARDELLA,
LUIGI ORSENIGO & FABIO PAMMOLLI, GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS IN PHARMACEUTICALS: A
EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE 11–13 (2000).
The productivity challenge in the pharmaceutical industry can be explained in part
by an increase in R&D costs, reduced output, and depleted pipelines. Innovation
losses in developing new drugs are increasing across the industry. Although the
number of new, approved molecular entities has remained steady in the past ten
years, the cost of new drug development has increased significantly in both the U.S.
and the EU. The pharmaceutical industry in both the U.S. and the EU are looking for
new ways to sustain pharmaceutical innovation and sell new products. At the same
time, pharmaceutical enterprises suffer from inefficient internal processes to perform
basic science and to assess the value of “proof of concept” inventions, especially when
they involve distant knowledge domains.
Bagley & Tvarnø, supra note 16, at 379.
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Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and the
Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority (BARDA),
including their use of the federal government’s Other Transaction
Authority (discussed in Part III), combined with the use of publicprivate partnerships 20 of the sort currently used by participants in the
European Union’s Innovative Medicines Initiative (IMI), 21 the
European Commission’s Action Plan Against the Rising Threats from

20 See Bagley & Tvarnø, supra note 14, at 3; Bagley & Tvarnø, supra note 16, at 373–74. See
also LINDA PARKER, THE ENGINEERING RESEARCH CENTERS (ERC) PROGRAM: AN ASSESSMENT
OF BENEFITS AND OUTCOMES i, 1 (1997), https://www.nsf.gov/pubs/1998/nsf9840/nsf9840.pdf
[https://perma.cc/KQ58-MR7W] (describing the Engineering Research Centers Program, a
government-university-industry partnership the National Science Foundation established in
1985 to enhance the global competitiveness of U.S. firms by creating “long-term collaborations
between universities and industry” and “new industry-relevant knowledge at the intersections
of the traditional disciplines,” as well as by developing “a new generation of engineering leaders
who are more capable of engaging successfully in team-based, cross-disciplinary engineering
practice”).
21 The European Union’s Innovative Medicines Initiative (IMI), Europe’s largest publicprivate partnership in the life sciences, was launched in 2008. See History—the IMI Story So Far,
INNOVATIVE MEDS. INITIATIVE, https://www.imi.europa.eu/about-imi/history-imi-story-so-far
[https://perma.cc/46B6-SCFM] (last visited Oct. 22, 2018). It has a budget of €5.3 billion and
has funded almost 100 projects. INNOVATIVE MEDS. INITIATIVE, http://www.imi.europa.eu
[https://perma.cc/S872-XPGS] (last visited Oct. 22, 2018). As Bagley & Tvarnø explain:

The public party is the EU, represented by the European Commission (“EC”). The
private party is the pharmaceutical industry, represented by the European Federation
of Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations (“EFPIA”) and its members. Among
other projects, the IMI supports the European Lead Factory public-private
partnership, an international consortium comprising thirty partners that have agreed
to pool 500,000 chemical compounds; 300,000 compounds came from AstraZeneca,
Bayer Pharma, Merck, Sanofi and three other member companies, and the balance
will come from academia and smaller firms.
Each IMI call[] for a project proposal involves open competition for funding as well
as multiple stakeholders, including EFPIA, private pharmaceutical and biotechnology
enterprises ranging from large to small, universities, hospitals, patient organizations,
and public authorities. Thus, universities and firms bid for government and industry
funds to support research in areas of high medical need. All IMI contracts are subject
to EU regulations, including those pertaining to the ownership of any resulting
discoveries . . . .
Bagley & Tvarnø, supra note 14, at 16–17. See Rogério Gaspar et al., Towards a European
Strategy for Medicines Research (2014–2020): The EUFEPS Position Paper on Horizon 2020, 47
EUR. J. PHARMACEUTICAL SCI. 979, 980 (2012). For more information on the Innovative
Medicines Initiative (IMI), see How IMI Works, INNOVATIVE MEDS. INITIATIVE, http://
www.imi.europa.eu/about-imi/how-imi-works [https://perma.cc/RDT3-KXRT] (last visited
Sept. 30, 2018).
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Antimicrobial Resistance, 22 and by certain U.S. entities under the BayhDole Act. 23 Our initiative also includes another component: identifying
and generating ecosystems of excellence 24 housing incubators that will
bring together all the players and resources needed to support
breakthrough multi-disciplinary discoveries. This new model will
provide platforms, infrastructure, and services for both accelerating
developments in countermeasure and creating a data commons.
The need for speed is very real. On January 25, 2018, the Bulletin of
American Scientists moved up the Doomsday Clock thirty seconds to
two minutes to midnight, its closest to the midnight apocalypse since
1953 when the Americans and Russians tested the first hydrogen bombs.
In a 2018 letter, the Union of the Concerned Atomic Scientists’ CEO
and President Rachel Bronson stated:
22 See generally ELTA SMITH ET AL., EVALUATION OF THE EC ACTION PLAN AGAINST THE
RISING THREATS FROM ANTIMICROBIAL RESISTANCE: FINAL REPORT (2016), https://
ec.europa.eu/health/amr/sites/amr/files/amr_final-report_2016_rand.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
2UDV-PVXS].
23 See Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015 (codified as amended at 35
U.S.C. §§ 200–12 (2018)). Multiple federal statutes have been enacted to foster innovation,
including the Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-480, 94
Stat. 2311 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 3701–14 (2018)); Small Business Innovation
Development Act of 1982, Pub. L. 97-219, 96 Stat. 217 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 638
(2018)); National Cooperative Research Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-462, 98 Stat. 1815 (codified
as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 4301–05 (2018)); Small Business Technology Transfer Act of 1992,
Pub. L. No. 102-564, § 201, 106 Stat. 4249, 4256–61 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 631
(2018)); America COMPETES Reauthorization Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-358, § 404, 124
Stat. 3982, 4001 (2011) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 278k (2018)) (establishing the
Manufacturing Extension Partnership); National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years
1992 and 1993, Pub. L. No. 102-190, §§ 2521–26, 105 Stat. 1290, 1426–32 (1991) (Defense
Industrial and Technology Base Initiative); High-Performance Computing Act of 1991, Pub. L.
No. 102-194, § 102, 105 Stat. 1594, 1598–99 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 5501–28
(2018)); Small Business Research and Development Enhancement Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102564, 106 Stat. 4249 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 631 (2018)); Department of Commerce
Advanced Technology Program (ATP), 15 C.F.R. § 295.1 (2018). For further details on this
legislation, see Anat Alon-Beck, The Coalition Model, a Private-Public Strategic Innovation
Policy Model for Encouraging Entrepreneurship and Economic Growth in the Era of New
Economic Challenges, 17 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 270, 284 (2018).
24 David J. Teece defines a “business ecosystem” as “a number of firms and other
institutions that work together to create and sustain new markets and new products.” David J.
Teece, Next-Generation Competition: New Concepts for Understanding How Innovation Shapes
Competition and Policy in the Digital Economy, 9 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 97, 104 (2012); see also
JOSH LERNER, BOULEVARD OF BROKEN DREAMS: WHY PUBLIC EFFORTS TO BOOST
ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND VENTURE CAPITAL HAVE FAILED—AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT
(2009).
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In 2017, we saw reckless language in the nuclear realm heat up
already dangerous situations and re-learned that minimizing
evidence-based assessments regarding climate and other global
challenges does not lead to better public policies.
Although the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists focuses on
nuclear risk, climate change, and emerging technologies, the
nuclear landscape takes center stage in this year’s Clock
statement. Major nuclear actors are on the cusp of a new arms
race, one that will be very expensive and will increase the
likelihood of accidents and misperceptions. Across the globe,
nuclear weapons are poised to become more rather than less
usable because of nations’ investments in their nuclear
arsenals. 25
President Trump has called for increasing the U.S. defense budget
by 7% to $716 billion for fiscal year 2019, 26 primarily to increase the
offensive power of the U.S. military. This Article focuses on the
defensive side of the ledger in a world where not only nation states, but
also non-state actors or rogue states, like North Korea, can cause mass
destruction and panic. 27
Part I provides a brief summary of the role the federal government
has played as a powerful market actor, particularly in the areas of public
defense and innovation, including the Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency (formerly known as ARPA), the tremendously
successful advanced research initiative that led to groundbreaking
innovations, such as computer technology, the internet, and self-driving
vehicles.

25 BULLETIN OF ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, 2018 DOOMSDAY CLOCK STATEMENT 1 (2018), https://
thebulletin.org/sites/default/files/2018%20Doomsday%20Clock%20Statement.pdf
[https://
perma.cc/B3LZ-XPAM] (Statement from Rachel Bronson, President and CEO, Bulletin of the
Atomic Scientists); see also Lindsey Bever et al., The Doomsday Clock is Now Just 2 Minutes to
‘Midnight,’ the Symbolic Hour of the Apocalypse, WASH. POST (Jan. 25, 2018), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/news/speaking-of-science/wp/2018/01/25/after-a-missile-scare-andinsult-war-with-north-korea-its-time-to-check-the-doomsday-clock/?utm_term=.72758
f5758ad [https://perma.cc/B4TZ-Y7TU].
26 Anthony Capaccio & Erik Wasson, Pentagon Wins as Trump Readies a $716 Billion
Budget Request, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 26, 2018, 2:48 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2018-01-26/trump-is-said-to-seek-716-billion-for-defense-in-2019-budget.
27 Id.; see also Fidler, supra note 10, at 816–19; Disruptive Technologies Push Bioterrorism to
a Whole New Level, supra note 10.
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In Part II we discuss several of the most significant government
initiatives undertaken after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001
(9/11) and their strengths and shortcomings. Lest we repeat the
mistakes of the past, Part II explains why many of the federal policies to
accelerate the commercial development of countermeasures, especially
endeavors to incentivize the biopharmaceutical industry to invest in
such developments, had limited success. 28
In Part III we propose the creation of the Defense of Health
Countermeasures Initiative, a multi-prong proposal to create a
defensive triad comprising government, private industry, and academia
to develop countermeasures for health threats posed by CBRN attacks.
Key elements include the use of the government’s Other Transaction
Authority to simplify procurement arrangements, the establishment of
public-private partnerships with trusted intermediaries, and the creation
of a network of incubators sited in ecosystems of excellence.
Part IV discusses potential challenges to collaboration and our
responses thereto. We conclude with a summary of our proposal and a
brief discussion of areas for further research.
I. GOVERNMENT AS MARKET ACTOR
Noble Laureate Robert M. Solow identified technological
innovation as a fundamental source for productivity and the only
reliable engine that drives change and sustained economic growth. 29
Paul Romer, who shared the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic
Sciences with William D. Nordhaus in 2018, helped confirm that
innovation promotes growth, but Romer went on to theorize that the
pace at which the market generates new ideas and “the way in which
they are translated into growth depend on other factors—such as state

28 See Capaccio & Wasson, supra note 26; see also Tara O’Toole & Thomas V. Inglesby,
Editorial, Toward Biosecurity, 1 BIOSECURITY & BIOTERRORISM: BIODEFENSE STRATEGY,
PRACTICE, & SCI. 1 (2003); Lynne Gilfillan et al., Taking the Measure of Countermeasures:
Leaders’ Views on the Nation’s Capacity to Develop Biodefense Countermeasures, 2 BIOSECURITY
& BIOTERRORISM: BIODEFENSE STRATEGY, PRAC., & SCI. 320 (2004); Laura DeFrancesco,
Throwing Money at Biodefense, 22 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 375 (2004).
29 Robert M. Solow, Nobel Prize Laureate, Prize Lecture: Growth Theory and After (Dec. 8,
1987), https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/economics/1987/solow/lecture [https://perma.cc/
NG5R-PNDB].
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support for research and development or intellectual-property
protections.” 30
Throughout U.S. history, governments have played the role of
catalyst, venture capitalist, beta tester, and early adopter to promote
technological research, development, and commercialization. 31 As
demonstrated by the Manhattan Project during World War II, and
projects sponsored by the DARPA and the Central Intelligence Agency’s
In-Q-Tel program (both discussed below), the U.S. government is
capable of taking bold steps to foster the development of radically
innovative technology to protect the American people from artificial
and natural national threats. Further, legislation and regulations, such as
transferable vouchers for fast-track FDA review (discussed in Section
IV.A), the 21st Century Cures Act 32 (discussed in Section I.C), and the
Global Combating Antibiotic Resistant Bacteria Biopharmaceutical
Accelerator initiative (CARB-X) (discussed in detail in Section II.C 33),
can spur commercial efforts to innovate.
A.

The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)

DARPA is a prime example of a successful governmental
intervention in the market. 34 Created during the 1960s following the
Soviet Union’s successful and unexpected launch of the first satellite
Sputnik, 35 DARPA provided funding to members from the scientific
community, public sector, university-based researchers, industry

The Nobel Prize for Economics Is Awarded for Work on the Climate and Economic
Growth, ECONOMIST (Oct. 8, 2018), https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2018/
10/08/the-nobel-prize-for-economics-is-awarded-for-work-on-the-climate-and-economicgrowth.
31 LERNER, supra note 24, at 6.
32 Pub. L. No. 114-255, 130 Stat. 1033 (2016).
33 See infra text accompanying notes 209–13.
34 Richard N. Kuyath, The Untapped Potential of the Department of Defense’s “Other
Transaction” Authority, 24 PUB. CONT. L.J. 521, 526–28 (1995); see Fred Block, Swimming
Against the Current: The Rise of a Hidden Developmental State in the United States, 36 POL. &
SOC’Y 169, 175 (2008) (“ARPA’s Information Processing Techniques Office (IPTO) was initially
established in 1962 and played a central role in the advance of computer technology . . . IPTO
provided the resources to create computer science departments at major universities and
funded a series of research project[s] that successfully pushed forward advances in humancomputer interface.”).
35 See Block, supra note 34, at 175.
30
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syndicates, and private corporations (including start-ups). 36 The agency
facilitated cooperation and information exchange among visionary and
creative technologists from diverse development and research sites,
including helping private firms commercialize new discoveries. 37
DARPA provided venture capital-like services, including mentoring,
strategic planning, and technological and business brokering services.
Although the technologists were given wide discretion, DARPA helped
determine the course of research and served as a catalyst for
innovation. 38 According to Erica Fuchs,
[T]he little-studied key to DARPA’s success lies with its program
managers. Each program manager, who is temporarily on leave from
a permanent position in the academic or industrial research
community, is given tremendous autonomy to identify and fund
relevant technologies in his or her own field that are relevant to
specific military purposes. To carry out their roles, program
managers must execute four interrelated tasks: learn about current or
forthcoming military challenges; identify emerging technologies that
have the potential to address those challenges; grow the community
of researchers working on these emerging technologies; and be sure,
as this community evolves, to transfer responsibility for the further
development and eventual commercialization of these technologies
either to the military services or the commercial sector. 39

To minimize abuse or waste, DARPA staff transferred resources from
unproductive groups to more promising, productive, and profitable
ones. 40

36 See Alon-Beck, supra note 23, at 283 (“ARPA operated small offices staffed with top
engineers and scientists, who were given extensive budget autonomy to sponsor promising
ideas.”); Block, supra note 34 at 175.
37 See Alon-Beck, supra note 23, at 273, 277, 283–84.
38 Id. at 283–84; see also Block, supra note 34, at 173–75.
39 Erica R. H. Fuchs, The Road to a New Energy System: Cloning DARPA Successfully, 26
ISSUES IN SCI. & TECH. 65, 67 (2009).
40 Block, supra note 34, at 175 (stating that ARPA employed visionary and creative
technologists and gave them the autonomy to grant research funds). Failing contractors or
projects are promptly cut from a DARPA program: “No projects or performers are so
sacrosanct that poor performance is tolerated. The flip side of this willingness to stop failing
efforts is that resources continuously become available to support new and emerging
opportunities.” NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADEMIES ET AL., Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency Relationships, in GOVERNMENT/INDUSTRY/ACADEMIC RELATIONSHIPS

Bagley.Beck.40.2.7 (Do Not Delete)

2018]

P R E P A R I N G F O R T H E A P O C A L YP S E

1/17/2019 6:14 PM

837

Through DARPA and other initiatives, the federal government not
only established many of the processes that formed the U.S. national
innovation system, but also played an active role as a “market-maker.”41
It took a risk-bearing role to create the infrastructure for the high
technology world of today. 42 Commercial fruits of government
participation include not only computers and the internet, but jet
planes, rockets, radar, lasers, civilian nuclear energy, GPS, and
biotechnology (or biotech) as well.
More recently, DARPA’s driverless car Grand Challenge, initiated
in 2004, caused the United States to go “from a car that traveled 7.5
miles in a desert to a car driving itself down the George Washington
Parkway in live traffic in 11 years.”43 This was accomplished “at a
fraction of the cost and with a far broader set of contributors than a
wholly government-driven effort could have supported.” 44 DARPA
“rewarded a few teams to keep them going but also attracted other
teams who used their own resources. It iterated and accepted failures
along the way. By providing focus and proofs of concept, it was able to
build the critical mass to attract large commercial R&D investments.” 45
TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT: A WORKSHOP REPORT (2005), https://www.nap.edu/read/
11206/chapter/4 [https://perma.cc/J2B4-7DPS] [hereinafter NAT’L ACADEMIES OF SCIENCES].
41 See Alon-Beck, supra note 23, at 271; see also Robert C. Hockett & Saule T. Omarova,
“Private” Means to “Public” Ends: Governments as Market Actors, 15 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES
L. 53, 54–57 (2014). Nelson found that the national security concerns of the nations had been
central in shaping their innovation systems. NATIONAL INNOVATION SYSTEMS: A
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS, supra note 13, at 508; see also PETER F. DRUCKER, INNOVATION AND
ENTREPRENEURSHIP: PRACTICE AND PRINCIPLES 257 (1985).
42 See Alon-Beck, supra note 23, at 277; see also Hockett & Omarova, supra note 41, at 56–
57; Marc Berejka, A Case for Government Promoted Multi-Stakeholderism, 10 J. TELECOMM. &
HIGH TECH. L. 1, 1–2 (2012). For examples of federal legislation promoting innovation, see
statutes cited supra note 23.
43 Alan Pentz, Agencies Can Seed Future Success with Creative Investment, GOV’T
EXECUTIVE (Feb. 8, 2016), http://www.govexec.com/excellence/nextgen-strategist/2016/02/
agencies-can-seed-future-success-creative-investment/125747 [https://perma.cc/N663-H3FZ].
44 Id.
45 Id.; see NAT’L ACADEMIES OF SCIENCES, supra note 40; see also Block, supra note 34, at
174–75 (stating that following World War II, the Pentagon worked intimately and cooperated
with other national security agencies, including the Atomic Energy Commission and the
National Aeronautics and Space Agency (NASA), and that such cooperation and funding had a
key role in developing these technologies). On the invention of the internet, the personal
computer, the laser, and Microsoft Windows, see Erica R.H. Fuchs, Rethinking the Role of the
State in Technology Development: DARPA and the Case for Embedded Network Governance, 39
RES. POL’Y 1133 (2010). See also John Sedgwick, The Men from DARPA, PLAYBOY, Aug. 1, 1991,
at 108, 122, 154–56.
FOR
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As discussed further below, DARPA used its “Other Transaction
Authority” to remove some of the administrative barriers that
previously deterred many commercial companies from participating in
the government marketplace. 46 The DARPA model thus spurred
innovation and competition by providing incentives to commercial
companies “that lack the capabilities or desire to perform governmentfunded research under standard procurement contracts, grants, or
cooperative agreements.” 47 Thus, the U.S. government has a proven
track record as a powerful market actor. 48
B.

In-Q-Tel

Another successful example of the government as a driver of
market competition is the first government-funded venture capital firm,
In-Q-Tel. 49 Launched in 1999 by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency

46 NAT’L ACADEMIES OF SCIENCES, supra note 42, at 23 (“[T]he majority of DARPA’s large
prototype system work was done using the OTA mechanism.”).
47 Kuyath, supra note 34, at 524; see also Richard L. Dunn, Other Transaction Contracts:
Poorly Understood, Little Used, NAT’L DEFENSE (May 15, 2017), http://www.national
defensemagazine.org/articles/2017/5/15/other-transactions-contracts-poorly-understood-littleused [https://perma.cc/E5X9-FK93].
48 See Hockett & Omarova, supra note 41, at 55–57; LERNER, supra note 24, at 179.
49 During the time of In-Q-Tel’s establishment, the idea of a government-funded venture
capital firm was entirely novel. See Steve Henn, In-Q-Tel: The CIA’s Tax-Funded Player in
Silicon Valley, NPR (July 16, 2012, 9:43 AM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/alltechconsidered/
2012/07/16/156839153/in-q-tel-the-cias-tax-funded-player-in-silicon-valley (“Whether you
have realized it or not, over the past 13 years In-Q-Tel has changed your life. ‘Much of the
touch-screen technology used now in iPads and other things came out of various companies
that In-Q-Tel identified,’ [former general counsel of the CIA Jeffrey] Smith says.”); Alon-Beck,
supra note 23, at 29; see also LERNER, supra note 24, at 176–77 (“For many of the start-ups,
which had targeted corporate customers, the challenges of breaking into government
procurements were daunting.”); John T. Reinert, In-Q-Tel: The Central Intelligence Agency as
Venture Capitalist, 33 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 677, 679–80, 679 n.7 (2013) (citing Deals & Deal
Makers—Memo to Techies: This Army Wants Your Energy Ideas, WALL ST. J., May 9, 2003, at
C5) (noting that the Army, NASA, the U.S. Postal Service, and other government agencies were
interested in investing in technology ventures); Marc Kaufman, NASA Invests in Its Future with
Venture Capital Firm ‘Red Planet’ Nonprofit to Fund Aerospace Innovation, WASH. POST, Oct.
31, 2006, at A19; Press Release, NASA, NASA Forms Partnership with Red Planet Capital, Inc.
(Sept. 20, 2006), http://www.nasa.gov/home/hqnews/2006/sep/HQ_06317_red_capital.html
[https://perma.cc/2CJY-T4PM]; Joe Davidson, Postal Service Desperate for Good Ideas to End
Run of Bad News, WASH. POST (June 23, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/
content/article/2010/06/22/AR2010062205248.html [https://perma.cc/Q5L6-Q8CE].
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(CIA), In-Q-Tel’s charge was to “swim in [Silicon] Valley” 50 and invest
in emerging technology firms (making small stake investments by
utilizing venture-like processes). 51 In-Q-Tel allowed the CIA to invest in
high technology firms that had not done business with the government
before, serving as a bridge between the government (as a customer for
innovative products and services) and emerging growth technology
firms.52
In-Q-Tel was successful for many reasons, including its geographic
proximity 53 to Silicon Valley and its ability to simplify the process of
50 Then-CIA Director George Tenet said In-Q-Tel was created for this reason. Tim Cooke,
Innovation By and For the Government, GOV’T EXECUTIVE (Oct. 2, 2017), http://
www.govexec.com/excellence/promising-practices/2017/10/innovation-and-government/
141433 [https://perma.cc/77SE-E9JK]; see also Reinert, supra note 49, at 693–94.
51 See LERNER, supra note 24, at 176 (by presenting new firms and technologies as
candidates for acquisition by the CIA, In-Q-Tel served as a bridge linking private and public
entities and enhanced the government’s role as a new customer for products developed by
emerging growth firms); see also BUS. EXECS. FOR NAT’L SEC., ACCELERATING THE ACQUISITION
AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NEW TECHNOLOGIES FOR INTELLIGENCE: THE REPORT OF THE
INDEPENDENT PANEL ON THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY IN-Q-TEL VENTURE 15–16
(2001) [hereinafter BENS REPORT] (comparing the In-Q-Tel model with the traditional VC
model).
52 See Alon-Beck, supra note 23, at 29 n.177.
53 Id. at 37. Geographic proximity is a very important contributor. Personal similarity also
matters. See Ola Bengtsson & David H. Hsu, How Do Venture Capital Partners Match with
Startup Founders? (Mar. 2010) (unpublished working paper), https://ssrn.com/abstract=
1568131. According to Bengtsson and Hsu,

[P]ersonal similarity matters in the [venture capitalist (VC)] matching market. We
find that a match between a founder and a VC partner is twice as likely when both
share the same ethnic background. A match is also more likely if both attended a top
ranked university. As further evidence of the importance of similarity, we show that
when the founder and VC partner share an ethnic tie or have both attended a top
ranked university the VC’s investment represents a larger fraction of its aggregate
investments in all portfolio companies. These linkages are significant only for early
stage investments in industries with higher levels of intangible assets, for which
information costs are likely to be more pronounced. These linkages are also more
important when the distance between VC and company is greater. These subsample
findings suggest that the economic role of similarity is reduce[d] information costs.
We infer that lower information costs associated with similar personal characteristics
allow VCs to make larger investments.
Id. at 4; see also Lars Ola Bengtsson, Repeated Relationships Between Venture Capitalists and
Entrepreneurs 3–5 (2006) (unpublished MBA thesis, University of Chicago) (on file with
University of Chicago, Graduate School of Business) (after examining data on roughly 1,500
serial entrepreneurs, Bengtsson found that a failed entrepreneur is twice as likely to repeat VC
relationships (as evaluated against a successful entrepreneur)).
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federal procurement. The CIA used its Other Transaction Authority
(OTA), a flexible contracting vehicle that lowers transaction costs by
reducing the disincentives non-traditional government bidders
experience when trying to contract with the federal government. 54 We
discuss OTA further in Section III.C.
“Unlike a true venture capital model, In-Q-Tel is more aptly
described as a ‘technology accelerator,’ seeking speed and agility in
discovering innovative IT solutions for the Agency.” 55 Its value
proposition centered on obtaining IT solutions, not foremost on return
on equity or assets. Deals always resulted in a product or service (e.g.,
feasibility assessment, test product, or prototype). As with venture
capital (VC) funding, the CIA’s investments were “smart money,” which
provided the portfolio companies with not only cash but also
“intellectual capital [and] technology-related experience.”56 The CIA
also offered “the Agency as a potential test-bed.” 57 Consistent with its
results-oriented approach, the CIA conducted extensive due diligence
before forming a contract comprising an “[i]n-depth investigation into
the [potential portfolio] company’s structure and financial status as well
as the ability of the proposed technology to meet the Agency problem
domain.” 58
To encourage recruitment of established managers and staff from
the venture capital industry, and to prevent them from leaving In-Q-Tel
for more lucrative private positions, the CIA offered a rewarding
compensation scheme, which was very unusual compared with typical
government jobs. 59 “The [compensation] included a flat salary, a bonus
paid based on how well In-Q-Tel met government needs, and an
employee investment program, which took a prespecified portion of
each employee’s salary and invested alongside . . . [the] portfolio.” 60

54 See Kuyath, supra note 34, at 524. According to Kuyath, OTA arrangements are in line
with the purpose of the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-355, 108
Stat. 3243 (codified in scattered sections of 10 and 41 U.S.C.). Kuyath, supra note 34, at 524.
55 BENS REPORT, supra note 51, at ix; see About IQT, IN-Q-TEL, https://www.iqt.org/aboutiqt [https://perma.cc/67DB-DB4D] (last visited Oct. 27, 2018).
56 BENS REPORT, supra note 51, at ix.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 See LERNER, supra note 24, at 176.
60 Id. at 177. For example, in 2012, its CEO Christopher Darby earned roughly $1 million.
See Henn, supra note 49.
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21st Century Cures Act: Big Data and Artificial Intelligence

Acknowledging the urgent need for using big data and artificial
intelligence to develop new therapies, President Obama signed the 21st
Century Cures Act into law on December 13, 2016. 61 The Act
established “Information Commons” initiatives to facilitate broad, open,
and responsible sharing of data. 62 Signaling the value of large data sets
comprising information garnered from electronic health records
(EHRs), pharmaceutical giant Roche agreed in February 2018 to pay
$1.9 billion to acquire Flatiron Health, a privately held New York-based
healthcare technology company. 63 Flatiron Health collects clinical data
on cancer patients and has previously teamed up 64 with public parties,
including the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 65 and the National

61 See Mary A. Majumder et al., Sharing Data Under the 21st Century Cures Act, 19
GENETICS MED. 1289 (2017).
62 See id. at 1289 (“At the same time, the Act exacerbates or neglects several challenges, for
example, increasing complexity by adding a new definition of ‘identifiable’ and failing to
address the financial sustainability of data sharing and the scope of commercialization. In sum,
the Act is a positive step, yet there is still much work to be done before the goals of broad data
sharing and utilization can be achieved.”).
63 See Lydia Ramsey, Pharma Giant Roche is Buying Cancer Tech Startup Flatiron Health for
$1.9 Billion, BUS. INSIDER (Feb. 15, 2018, 3:52 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/rocheacquires-flatiron-health-for-19-billion-2018-2?r=UK&IR=T [https://perma.cc/4GD8-UM3F].
“Flatiron has raised more than $300 million from investors across the technology and health
care investors, including Roche, Allen & Company, GV, First Round Capital and SV Angel.”
Christina Farr, Alphabet-Backed Flatiron Health Is Being Acquired by Roche, CNBC (Feb. 15,
2018, 3:02 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/02/15/roche-buying-flatiron-health-backed-byalphabet.html [https://perma.cc/9A2G-6R2J].
64 On Flatiron’s partnerships and milestones, see Nat Turner, Flatiron’s Next Phase,
FLATIRON HEALTH (Feb. 15, 2018), https://flatiron.com/blog/roche [https://perma.cc/UP7UJCM2].
65 See Nick Paul Taylor, FDA Teams with Flatiron for Real-World Cancer Data Analytics
Project, FIERCEBIOTECH (May 27, 2016, 8:04 AM), https://www.fiercebiotech.com/it/fda-teamsflatiron-for-real-world-cancer-data-analytics-project [https://perma.cc/CZL4-J9KM]; see also
Michael Mezher, Woodcock: Drug Safety Surveillance System Ready for Full Operation, REG.
AFF. PROFS. SOC’Y (Feb. 3, 2016), https://www.raps.org/news-articles/news-articles/2016/2/
woodcock-drug-safety-surveillance-system-ready-for-full-operation [https://perma.cc/8UHZ5CXA] (“Launched in 2008, the Sentinel initiative encompasses FDA’s effort to meet
obligations set by Congress in the 2007 Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act
(FDAAA) to develop a system for active postmarket risk identification and analysis for medical
products.”).
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Cancer Institute, academic medical centers, 66 and private parties such as
independent community oncology practices, 67 life sciences oncology
companies, and others.
D.

Need for Additional Government Intervention for CBRN
Countermeasures

Notwithstanding existing public support for innovation and new
therapies, the U.S. federal government is losing its place as a world
leader in generating innovation, technology, and economic growth. 68 To
successfully compete in tomorrow’s marketplace, promote growth, and
protect its citizens, as well as to increase productivity and expand
economic and social value, 69 U.S. policymakers must institute sweeping
innovation policies to modernize the U.S. innovation infrastructure.
In the past, most of the U.S. research and development (R&D)
spending, which contributes to innovation, came from the Department
of Defense (DoD). For example, according to the Government
Accountability Office (GAO), 40% of R&D spending in the United
66 See Nick Paul Taylor, Roche Pens $1.9B Deal to Buy Oncology Data Firm Flatiron,
FIERCEBIOTECH (Feb. 16, 2018, 7:25 AM), https://www.fiercebiotech.com/biotech/roche-pens1-9b-deal-to-buy-oncology-data-firm-flatiron [https://perma.cc/LTX4-R2B8].
67 Flatiron Health

expanded partnerships with some of the nation’s largest independent community
oncology practices using the first EHR-embedded technology solution for the Center
for Medicare & Medicaid Innovation’s (CMMI) Oncology Care Model (OCM).
Approximately one-third of all OCM practices use Flatiron’s technology to adapt to
the rapidly-changing requirements of value-based care programs for which practices
commit to providing enhanced services to patients, such as care coordination,
navigation and the use of national treatment guidelines.
Press Release, Flatiron Health, Flatiron Health Expands Technology Partnerships with
Oncology Care Model Practices (June 13, 2017), https://flatiron.com/press/press-release/
flatiron-health-expands-technology-partnerships-with-oncology-care-model-practices [https://
perma.cc/9NPR-F3WA].
68 JOHN KAO, INNOVATION NATION: HOW AMERICA IS LOSING ITS INNOVATION EDGE,
WHY IT MATTERS, AND WHAT WE CAN DO TO GET IT BACK 3 (2007) (“In tomorrow’s world,
even more than today’s, innovation will be the engine of progress. So unless we move to rectify
this dismal situation, the United States cannot hope to remain a leader. What’s at stake is
nothing less than the future prosperity and security of our nation.”).
69 See Michael E. Porter & Mark R. Kramer, Creating Shared Value: How to Reinvent
Capitalism—and Unleash a Wave of Innovation and Growth, HARV. BUS. REV., Jan.–Feb. 2011,
at 1, 5.
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States came from the DoD in 1987. By 2013, the DoD provided less than
20% of the U.S. R&D, whereas commercial R&D increased its spending
by 200% between 1987 and 2013. 70 Today, however, the military and
commercial demands in the United States have diverged drastically, 71
resulting in declining civilian-military technology spillovers. 72 For
example, the U.S. military market no longer plays a strategic role in the
computer and semiconductor industries (as compared with its position
in the 1960s). 73
Government is once again needed to drive the innovation
necessary to even begin to seriously address today’s CBRN threats. The
need is particularly acute given the closing of major private R&D
institutions, such as Bell Labs and General Electric’s R&D enterprise. By
investing in knowledge, human capital, and innovation, governments
promote knowledge spillovers, 74 and thereby encourage the formation
(and survival) of new entrepreneurial firms and new lines of business in
existing firms. 75
The government is not a profit-maximizing entity, 76 and is
therefore in a better position than private investors to deal with
Cooke, supra note 50.
See Kenneth Flamm & Thomas L. McNaugher, Rationalizing Technology Investments, in
RESTRUCTURING AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 119 (John D. Steinbruner ed., 1989) (citing
declines in the share of basic research in DoD research and development spending, as well as
increases in the congressional demand for military research and development programs to yield
near-term applications in weapons systems).
72 Id. An exception is the DoD funding of the Small Business Innovation Research program,
on which it spends approximately $1 billion in grants annually. SMALL BUS. INNOVATION RES.
& SMALL BUS. TECH. TRANSFER PROGRAM INTERAGENCY POLICY COMM., SBIR/STTR
INTERAGENCY POLICY COMMITTEE REPORT TO CONGRESS: AWARD SIZE FLEXIBILITY 9 (2014),
http://www.sbir.gov/sites/default/files/3_award_size-ipc_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/LZG3DZUW].
73 See DAVID C. MOWERY & NATHAN ROSENBERG, PATHS OF INNOVATION:
TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE IN 20TH-CENTURY AMERICA 44–45 (1998).
74 See DAVID B. AUDRETSCH, ENTREPRENEURSHIP: A SURVEY OF THE LITERATURE 9–10
(2003),
http://ec.europa.eu/DocsRoom/documents/2977/attachments/1/translations/en/
renditions/pdf (discussing “knowledge spillover” and how “small firms account for a
disproportional share of new product innovations given their low R&D expenditures”).
75 LERNER, supra note 24, at 10.
76 See DAVID A. LEWIS, ELSIE HARPER-ANDERSON & LAWRENCE A. MOLNAR, INCUBATING
SUCCESS: INCUBATION BEST PRACTICES THAT LEAD TO SUCCESSFUL NEW VENTURES 8 (2011).
This study found:
70
71

Most high-achieving incubators are not-for-profit models. All but one of the topperforming incubators in this study were nonprofits, as were 93% of the respondent
population. This finding suggests that incubation programs focused on earning
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situations of great uncertainty that require long-term investments in
radical innovation. 77 Government actors are often not as efficient as
private firms, 78 but they can alleviate market inefficiencies and failures
by addressing the tragedy of the commons, 79 monitoring economic
progress and market trends, and guiding local systems and intraindustrial innovation to meet social and military needs. 80 By promoting
long-term development strategies, governments can serve as “bridge
builders” between the public sector and private businesses and
innovative industries. 81 Joint collaboration gives government scientists
an opportunity to learn from industry and vice versa. Ideally,
government participation complements, and does not replace, private
efforts to build emerging growth firms.
Public-private partnerships use various methods of collaboration
designed to combine the government’s forward-looking policies and
funds with the private sector’s innovative efforts. Such efforts often
include support from for-profit private intermediaries and nonprofit
organizations, such as private disease foundations. There are several
financing models of incubators, ranging from public non-profit to
quasi-public to private non-profit. 82 This Article centers on publicprivate and quasi-public–private partnerships, given the need for the
government to fund basic research and seed companies, in an industry
profits are not strongly correlated to client success. Instead, the most important goals
of top-performing incubation programs are creating jobs and fostering the
entrepreneurial climate in the community, followed by diversifying the local
economy, building or accelerating new industries and businesses, and attracting or
retaining businesses to the host region.
Id.

See id.
Id. at 9.
79 See Hockett & Omarova, supra note 41, at 57, 64–66 (explaining the “market-making”
role of the government whereby the government assumes certain risks that private actors are
unwilling or unable to assume in order to either “(a) make a publicly beneficial market possible,
or (b) facilitate an incipient such market’s growth to critical mass”).
80 Id. at 67.
81 See KAO, supra note 68, at 198 (“They also would serve as bridge-builders between
creative industries and the business mainstream, following models pioneered by such
organizations as the Learning Lab in Denmark and Arts & Business in the United Kingdom.
Above all, they would be mechanisms for linking federal, regional, and urban development
strategies.”).
82 For example, ten large pharmaceutical companies formed TransCelerate BioPharma
“based on a nonprofit precompetitive model, to speed drug development by broad participation
and collaboration across the global R&D community.” Chaguturu, supra note 1, at xx.
77
78
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in which the “average time between the ‘key enabling discovery’ and the
introduction of a drug is 12–15 years.” 83
But governments and industries cannot fill the countermeasure
pipeline alone. Institutes of higher learning (and national systems of
innovation 84) play critical roles in today’s knowledge economy. 85 The
“standard” growth theory in economics tends to concentrate on the
roles of the business firms (including the constraints and incentives that
are provided by competition in a market setting), and it is often blind to
a wide range of other institutions that have played key roles in
stimulating growth and driving innovation. 86 In the case of drug
discovery, “[p]ublicly funded research, occurring at universities and the
National Institutes of Health, over the years has produced a great
majority of the key enabling discoveries underlying nearly 80% of the
important drugs.”87 Typically, “the academic laboratory . . . identifies the
interesting molecular targets that are important enzymes and proteins
in various biochemical and physiological processes.” 88 The U.S.
government funded and made publicly available the sequencing of the
human genome, but it took academic researchers to convert the basic
science into innovative discoveries, including “the biomarkers of disease
identified in genomics, proteomics, and biochemical studies” and the
“identification of new messenger molecules and their receptors.” 89 For
example, the University of California and Stanford University were
instrumental in developing the gene sequencing techniques, which
biotech companies like Genentech commercialized. 90
83 Id. at xix; see also Filippo Belloc, Innovation in State-Owned Enterprises: Reconsidering
the Conventional Wisdom, 48 J. ECON. ISSUES 821, 823–25 (2014).
84 In this context, the term “systems” means a “set of institutional actors that, together,
play[] the major role in influencing innovation performance.” NATIONAL INNOVATION
SYSTEMS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS, supra note 13, at 4.
85 Id. at 4–5. See also Philippe Larédo & Philippe Mustar, Public Sector Research: A Growing
Role in Innovation Systems, 42 MINERVA 11 (2004).
86 Larédo & Mustar, supra note 85, at 11–12.
87 Chaguturu, supra note 1, at xix–xx.
88 Id.
89 Ferid Murad, Foreword, in Chaguturu, supra note 1, at xvi.
90 See Mark Edwards, Fiona Murray & Robert Yu, Value Creation and Sharing Among
Universities, Biotechnology and Pharma, 21 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 618 (2003), https://
ssrn.com/abstract=904260. As Edwards et al. explain:

Scientific institutions have always made a contribution to medical progress, but their
traditional role was to educate and to publish advances in basic science—creating the
intellectual foundation upon which others have built more commercial discoveries.
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To develop new treatments, vaccines, and protective devices,
government agencies need to collaborate with academia and private
industry to identify the specific challenges not being adequately
addressed by the private or governmental sectors. The government must
then be willing to help fund the cutting-edge public and private
research, innovation, development, and commercialization 91 necessary
to show proof of concept and feasibility. 92 Accordingly, the Defense of

In recent times, however, universities have become active participants in the
commercialization of scientific ideas through patenting and the establishment of
active technology licensing as a legitimate and increasingly important part of
academic life.
This is especially true with respect to university and medical center patenting in
biotechnology. For example, before 1989 the top recipient of biotechnology patents
was Merck (Whitehouse Station, NJ, USA); however, a decade later, in 1999, the
combined campuses of the University of California held that spot. In fact, twelve
academic institutions were among the top 40 biotechnology patent-generating
entities over this past decade, including Stanford University (Palo Alto, CA, USA),
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT; Cambridge, MA, USA), the
Massachusetts General Hospital (MGH; Boston, MA) and The Scripps Research
Institute (La Jolla, CA, USA).
Id. at 618.
91 As Charles Wessner, Director of the Program on Technology, Innovation, and
Entrepreneurship at the National Academy of Sciences, cautioned in 2008:
There is great complacency in Washington about the US position in the world. There
is relatively limited understanding in the policy community about the scale and scope
of foreign investments in new technologies, including new institutions, such as
ASTAR in Singapore or the large and apparently effective Chinese S&T Parks, or the
highly successful Microelectronics center, called IMEC, in Flanders. . . . [Although]
in the US we do not need to do exactly what others are doing . . . we do need to
greatly strengthen the interaction between the government, the universities, and the
private sector by providing a wide variety of incentives for cooperation on the new
technologies that will be the basis of future industries.
Quoted in Philipp Marxgut, Innovation Policy in the US—An Interview with Charles Wessner,
OFF. SCI. & TECH. AUSTRIA: BRIDGES (Oct. 19, 2008), http://ostaustria.org/bridges-magazine/
volume-19-october-16-2008/item/3585-innovation-policy-in-the-us-an-interview-with-charleswessner [https://perma.cc/Q87Q-7QDG].
92 The United States is already in competition with China for preeminence in the field of
artificial intelligence (AI). Like the space race between the United States and the former Soviet
Union, the AI race is likely to have a major impact on the next generation of innovation. While
China is actively funding start-ups, the United States has lagged in providing public funding,
relying instead on private actors like Google. See, e.g., Jackie Snow, The Defense Department Is
Taking on ISIS with Google’s Open-Source AI Software, MIT TECH. REV.: THE DOWNLOAD
(Mar. 6, 2018, 2:31 PM), https://www.technologyreview.com/the-download/610429/the-
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Health Countermeasures Initiative we propose in Part III is designed to
allow the government to make direct equity investments in seed projects
through the DHCI Incubators and national platforms for networks of
innovation hubs. At the same time, our proposed DHCI encourages
private actors to help finance such projects and makes it possible for
universities and academic scientists to share in the economic proceeds
through the Bayh-Dole Act and the glory through the right to publish
novel findings. This defensive triad, comprising government, academia,
and industry, should promote effectiveness and, more importantly,
reduce political capture (discussed further in Section IV.D) and other
distortions.
II. EXISTING MEASURES TO DEAL WITH THE THREAT OF CHEMICAL,
BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, AND NUCLEAR ATTACKS
Following the terror events of 9/11, including the anthrax attacks,
the federal government and certain states took various measures to
protect U.S. civilians from potential CBRN terrorism and other
emergency outbreaks. These included financial incentives to mobilize
the biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries to pursue the R&D of
medical countermeasures, such as diagnostic tests, drugs, vaccines, and
other treatments, that can minimize the impact of a CBRN attack. 93
Despite these efforts, the current pipeline of new countermeasures
is not robust. Many start-up companies continue to find themselves
trapped in the “Valley of Death,” populated by firms at the early stage of
development that are caught, as in amber, in the “time between a basic
science discovery (usually in academic labs) and the decision to commit
resources to develop the idea into a drug (almost always by industry).” 94
defense-department-is-taking-on-isis-with-googles-open-source-ai-software [https://perma.cc/
D7AK-7GUT].
93 See CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44786, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY ISSUES IN THE 115TH
CONGRESS 28 (2018) (“Policymakers identified a lack of such countermeasures as a challenge to
responding to the CBRN threat. To address this gap, the federal government created several
programs to encourage private sector development of new CBRN medical countermeasures.”).
94 Moving Drug Discoveries Beyond ‘The Valley of Death’, ABBVIE (Feb. 15, 2016), https://
stories.abbvie.com/stories/moving-drug-discoveries-beyond-the-valley-of-death.htm [https://
perma.cc/Y8DB-9GUZ]. The so-called “‘valley of death’ . . . separates ‘upstream research on
promising genes, proteins, and biological pathways’ by government-funded academic
researchers from ‘downstream drug candidates’ outside firms fund in hopes of commercializing
the researchers’ discoveries.” CONSTANCE E. BAGLEY & CRAIG E. DAUCHY, THE
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The Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and
Response Act of 2002

The Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and
Response Act of 2002 (PHSBPRA) specifically authorizes the Secretary
of Health and Human Services to “prevent, prepare for, and respond to
bioterrorism and other public health emergencies” 95 by coordinating the
activities of federal, state, and local governments. In accordance with
this mandate, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)
launched three programs in 2003: (1) the BioSense program, “a
nationwide integrated public health surveillance system for early
detection and assessment of potential bioterrorism-related illness”; 96 (2)
ENTREPRENEUR’S GUIDE TO LAW AND STRATEGY 155 (5th ed. 2018) (quoting Arti K. Rai et al.,
Pathways Across the Valley of Death: Novel Intellectual Property Strategies for Accelerated Drug
Discovery, 8 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 1, 4 (2008)); see LEWIS M. BRANSCOMB &
PHILLIP E. AUERSWALD, NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH, NIST GCR 02-841, BETWEEN
INVENTION AND INNOVATION: AN ANALYSIS OF FUNDING FOR EARLY-STAGE TECHNOLOGY
DEVELOPMENT 1–2, 4–5 (2002), https://www.nist.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2017/05/09/
gcr02-841.pdf [https://perma.cc/RF7G-492R]; GEORGE S. FORD ET AL., AN ECONOMIC
INVESTIGATION OF THE VALLEY OF DEATH IN THE INNOVATION SEQUENCE 2–3 (2007), http://
www.osec.doc.gov/Report-Valley%20of%20Death%20Funding%20Gap.pdf [https://perma.cc/
9TUV-CMBM]; see also PHILIP E. AUERSWALD ET AL., NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH,
NIST GCR 02-841A, UNDERSTANDING PRIVATE-SECTOR DECISION MAKING FOR EARLY-STAGE
TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT: A “BETWEEN INVENTION AND INNOVATION PROJECT” REPORT
(2005), http://www.nist.gov/tpo/sbir/upload/gcr02-841a.pdf [https://perma.cc/C3P6-6M8B];
Ederyn Williams, Crossing the Valley of Death, INGENIA, Nov.–Dec. 2004, at 23, http://
www2.warwick.ac.uk/services/ventures/valley.pdf [https://perma.cc/5ABB-MH3Q] (discussing
valley of death in the United Kingdom); Philipp Marxgut, supra note 91.
95 Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, Pub. L.
No. 107-188, 116 Stat. 594.
96 Deborah W. Gould et al., The Evolution of BioSense: Lessons Learned and Future
Directions, 132 PUB. HEALTH REP. 7S–11S (2017).
The initial BioSense program had 4 goals: (1) improve the nation’s capabilities for
conducting near–real-time biosurveillance and health situational awareness; (2)
advance analytics for prediagnostic and diagnostic data; (3) increase sharing of
approaches and technology among federal, state, and local public health agencies;
and (4) promote national system standards and specifications to ensure integration
with other public health systems.
Id.; see also Colleen A. Bradley et al., BioSense: Implementation of a National Early Event
Detection and Situational Awareness System, 54 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. S11
(2005); Jerome I. Tokars et al., Summary of Data Reported to CDC’s National Automated
Biosurveillance System, 2008, 10 BMC MED. INFORMATICS & DECISION MAKING 1, 11–12
(2010); Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, Pub.
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the BioShield program, which is charged with accelerating “the research,
development, acquisition, and availability of medical countermeasures
to improve the government’s preparedness for and ability to counter
chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threat agents; 97 and (3)

L. No. 107-188, 116 Stat. 594; John W. Loonsk, BioSense—A National Initiative for Early
Detection and Quantification of Public Health Emergencies, 53 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY
WKLY. REP. 53 (2004).
A major component of the BioSense system was the infrastructure that CDC
developed to receive and securely manage health care-sourced data and to host the
BioSense application for analyzing and visualizing data reported to BioSense. The
infrastructure included (1) data management processes to receive and process
inbound clinical care and related data, (2) analytic processes to bin records into
syndrome categories and analyze trends for suspect signals, and (3) a user interface
that allowed CDC and state and local staff members to access patient-level data to
investigate results, report on notifications, and coordinate responses. Data from
different sources were added to the BioSense system over time, including data from
US Department of Veterans Affairs and US Department of Defense hospitals and
ambulatory care clinics (2003), test orders from the Laboratory Corporation of
America (2004), data from nonfederal hospitals directly reporting to CDC (2005),
data from state health departments’ syndromic surveillance systems (2006), antiinfective prescription data from Relay Health outpatient pharmacies (2007), and test
orders from Quest Diagnostics (2007). By 2008, the primary data sources for
BioSense included 333 Department of Defense and 770 Veterans Affairs hospitals
and ambulatory clinics and 532 civilian hospital emergency departments (EDs).
Gould et al., supra, at 7S.
97 Philip K. Russell, Project BioShield: What It Is, Why It Is Needed, and Its
Accomplishments So Far, 45 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES S68 (2007).
The legislation authorizes use of the Special Reserve Fund, which makes available
$5.6 billion over 10 years for the advanced development and purchase of medical
countermeasures. This appropriation is intended to provide an economic incentive to
the pharmaceutical industry to develop medical countermeasures for which the
government is the only significant market. Acquisitions under Project BioShield are
restricted to products in development that are potentially licensable within 8 years
from the time of contract award. In exercising the procurement authorities under
Project BioShield, HHS has launched acquisition programs to address each of the 4
threat agents, including Bacillus anthracis (anthrax), smallpox virus, botulinum
toxins, and radiological/nuclear agents, originally deemed by the Department of
Homeland Security to be threats to the US population sufficient to affect national
security. At the time of writing [2007], 7 contracts have been awarded: (1)
recombinant protective antigen anthrax vaccine, the next-generation anthrax vaccine
(contract terminated in December 2006 for default); (2) anthrax vaccine adsorbed,
the currently licensed anthrax vaccine; (3) anthrax therapeutics (monoclonal); (4)
anthrax therapeutics (human immune globulin); (5) the pediatric formulation of
potassium iodide; (6) Ca- and Zn-diethylenetriaminepentaacetate (DTPA), chelating
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BioWatch, a program “designed to sample the air in major metropolitan
areas for pathogens that terrorists might use.” 98
B.

BioShield

Of the three programs authorized by the PHSBPRA, this Article
will focus on the BioShield initiative. This federal program is designed
to address the CBRN threat gap by encouraging private sector
development of new CBRN medical countermeasures. Project BioShield
established a direct procurement mechanism whereby the federal
government can buy a countermeasure up to eight years before the
product is likely to be fully developed. 99 Although Project BioShield was
designed to remove barriers to procurement and to address the market
uncertainty faced by countermeasure developers, initial implementation
of Project BioShield 1 was not very successful. 100
The disappointing results of BioShield 1 were due in part to the
lack of adequate monetary incentives 101 to motivate private
pharmaceutical companies to invest the hundreds of millions of dollars
in R&D necessary to successfully produce a new medical
countermeasure. 102 The following are the five broad stages in the
agents to treat ingestion of certain radiological particles; and (7) botulinum
antitoxins. Additional acquisition contracts [were] expected to be awarded in 2007.
Id.

Gould et al., supra note 96, at 7S.
Russell, supra note 97, at S68.
100 See SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY ISSUES IN THE 115TH CONGRESS, supra note 93, at 28
(“Despite these efforts, the federal government still lacks medical countermeasures for many
CBRN threats, including Ebola.”). Since the publication of Peter K. Russell’s Article in 2007,
Russell, supra note 97, BARDA and Merck & Co. have developed an Ebola vaccine that BARDA
is seeking to license and perhaps add to the Strategic National Stockpile. Steve Brozak, An
Unlikely Biotech Investor: The Government, FORBES (June 8, 2018, 9:14 AM), https://
www.forbes.com/sites/stephenbrozak/2018/06/08/merck-and-achaogen-two-companiesworking-with-barda-to-fight-emerging-health-threats/#686518984fd0 [https://perma.cc/H4DZLNHE].
101 FRANK GOTTRON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43607, THE PROJECT BIOSHIELD ACT: ISSUES
FOR THE 113TH CONGRESS 1 n.1 (2014) (“Representatives of the pharmaceutical industry
attributed the paucity of CBRN agent countermeasures to the lack of a significant commercial
market.”) (citing Alan Pemberton, Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am., Testimony before the U.S.
H. Select Comm. on Homeland Security (May 15, 2003)).
102 See id. Joseph Larsen, former Deputy Director of BARDA, stressed the importance of
incentives, stating that both push and pull government incentives are often required to get
98
99
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innovation process, as well as the financial sources that are usually
available at each stage. 103 First is the stage of basic research, for which
funding is usually available to entrepreneurs from government sources,
such as the National Science Foundation (NSF), National Institutes of
Health (NIH), the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) phase I
(Feasibility and Proof of Concept), 104 and from private corporate
resources, such as the funds large corporations allocate to R&D. Second
is the proof of concept or invention stage, for which financing sources
usually include private angel investors, corporate R&D funds, and
government funding from SBIR phase II (Research/Research and
Development) 105 and technology labs. Third is the early-stage
technology development stage, which is often termed the Valley of

major pharmaceutical companies to participate. Telephone interview with Joseph Larsen,
Senior Vice President of Life Scis., Strategic Mktg. Innovations, Inc. (June 4, 2018). When the
U.S. government set up the dedicated fund to finance the development for anthrax cures and
vaccines as part of BioShield (a “pull” initiative), only small, inexperienced biotech companies
applied to participate. Id.
103 Except as noted otherwise, the balance of this paragraph is drawn from Alon-Beck, supra
note 23, at 296.
104 The SBIR program was founded in 1982. It was intended to encourage small businesses
to develop new products and processes as well as present valuable research for the nation’s
research and development efforts. The program requires the eleven federal agencies with
extramural research budgets in excess of $100 million to allocate a certain percentage of their
total extramural research and development budgets for grants or contracts to small businesses
conducting research and development that have commercialization potential and meet the
needs of the U.S. government. See CHARLES W. WESSNER, SBIR AND THE PHASE III CHALLENGE
OF COMMERCIALIZATION: REPORT OF A SYMPOSIUM 3–5, 9 (2007). According to Wessner:
Commercializing SBIR-funded technologies though federal procurement is no less
challenging for innovative small companies. Finding private sources of funding to
further develop even successful SBIR Phase II projects—those innovations that have
demonstrated technical and commercial feasibility—is often difficult because the
eventual “market” for products is unlikely to be large enough to attract private
venture funding. As Mark Redding of Impact Technologies noted at the conference,
venture capitalists tend to avoid funding firms focused on government contracts
citing higher costs, regulatory burdens, and limited markets associated with
government contracting.
Id. at 9; see also About SBIR, SBIR, http://www.sbir.gov/about/about-sbir [https://perma.cc/
WS3J-CDEX] (last visited Oct. 2, 2018) (listing the program’s objectives as: “Stimulate
technological innovation. Meet Federal research and development needs. Foster and encourage
participation in innovation and entrepreneurship by women and socially or economically
disadvantaged persons. Increase private-sector commercialization of innovations derived from
Federal research and development funding.”).
105 See About SBIR, supra note 104.

Bagley.Beck.40.2.7 (Do Not Delete)

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

852

1/17/2019 6:14 PM

[Vol. 40:823

Death because of the entrepreneur’s difficulty in obtaining financing for
this stage. 106 Fourth is product development, the stage at which private
venture capital firms traditionally invest in start-up firms. Fifth, and
last, is the production or marketing stage, for which financing sources
include private venture capitalists, corporate venture capital, private
equity, or commercial debt.
PHSBPRA provided inadequate R&D funding to get private actors
across the Valley of Death. 107 Even if a private firm was successful
developing a new treatment, there tended to be no continuous
commercial market for the product. “There is little incentive for
publicly-traded drug companies to make products with low profit
margins, infrequent use and a high likelihood of liability lawsuits, such
as vaccines.” 108
Second, the government was unwilling to guarantee that the
pharmaceutical companies’ patent and other intellectual property rights
would not be compromised if a public crisis required large scale
dissemination of their drugs. 109 After the anthrax attacks in 2001, the
See Bagley & Tvarnø, supra note 16, at 375; see also Alon-Beck, supra note 23, at 270–71.
See Alon-Beck, supra note 23, at 295–96.
108 See Janet Temko, The Project BioShield Act of 2004: An Innovative Failure 10 (May
2006) (unpublished third-year student paper, Harvard University), http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn3:HUL.InstRepos:8944670 (citing Scott Hensley & Bernard Wysocki Jr., Missing Medicine—
Shots in the Dark: As Industry Profits Elsewhere, U.S. Lacks Vaccines, Antibiotics; Incentives Are
Low to Develop Some Public-Health Drugs; New Moves in Washington; A $200 Million Legal
Fight, WALL ST. J., Nov. 8, 2005, at A.1). As Temko pointed out, “drugs that treat a disease are
more lucrative than vaccines to prevent it partly because people are more inclined to pay for a
medicine that treats a condition they already have.” Id. See also id. at 9 n.44 (“when you’re
dealing with a product for which there is no guarantee of a return, or for which the market is
tenuous, these companies clearly need some assurances that there will ultimately be a return for
their investment. Without such assurances, they will simply pursue the development of other
products.”) (quoting Project BioShield: Contracting for the Health and Security of the American
Public: Hearings Before the Comm. On Gov’t Reform, 108th Cong. 16, 10 n.44 (2003) (statement
of Dr. Anthony Fauci, Director, National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases)).
109 See Temko, supra note 108, at 9. Regarding the authority of ARPA to use OTA, Kuyath
explained:
106
107

In support of its position on the Bayh-Dole Act, ARPA relied on the legislative
history of two defense authorization acts. First, the conference report of the House
and Senate Armed Services Committees on the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 1992 stated:
The conferees also recognize that the regulations applicable to the allocation of
patent and data rights under the procurement statutes may not be appropriate
to partnership arrangements in certain cases. The conferees believe that the option
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government forced Bayer to lower the already discounted price of the
Cipro drug by threatening “to force compulsory licensing of the patent
on Cipro in order to enable generic companies to enter the market.”110
The PHSBPRA failed to address this issue.
Third, the PHSBPRA lacked adequate indemnification provisions
that would shield pharmaceutical companies from liability for new
to support partnerships pursuant to section 2371 of title 10, United States Code,
provides adequate flexibility for the Defense Department and other partnership
participants to agree to allocations of intellectual property rights in a manner
that will meet the needs of all parties involved in a transaction.
Additionally, the House Armed Services Committee report on the 1995 National
Defense Authorization bill noted:
. . . TRP policy provides that the Federal Government should avoid acquiring
rights if that will impede commercialization. Foreign access to technology is
scrutinized and, if deemed necessary, restricted. Broad exposure of the
technology among partnerships participants is encouraged. The Advanced
Research Projects Agency (ARPA) can fully effectuate these policies because it
has great flexibility to tailor patent and other intellectual property rights
provisions under its “other transactions” authority.
. . . The Bayh-Dole Act sets forth the Government’s policy regarding allocation of
patent rights to inventions conceived or first actually reduced to practice under
contracts, grants, and cooperative agreements with small business firms and
educational and other nonprofit organizations (subject inventions). This patent
policy also has been extended to large businesses. The contractor (or recipient, in the
case of grants and cooperative agreements) is permitted to retain title to subject
inventions and the Government receives a nonexclusive, nontransferable,
irrevocable, worldwide, paid-up license to practice or have practiced subject
inventions on behalf of the United States throughout the world.
Kuyath, supra note 34, at 531–32, 536–37.
110 See Temko, supra note 108, at 10 n.43 (citing Gregory M. Lamb, New Buffer for
Bioterror’s Tempest, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (July 1, 2004), https://www.csmonitor.com/
2004/0701/p14s02-stct.html (“After the anthrax letters scare, Tommy Thompson, the HHS
secretary, demanded that Bayer lower its prices on Cipro, an anthrax drug, or risk losing its
patent—sending a chilling signal to drugmakers.”); Roundtable Discussion: When Terror
Strikes—Preparing an Effective and Immediate Public Health Response: Hearing of the Comm.
On Health, Educ., Labor, & Pensions, 109th Cong. 47–48 (2005) (response to questions of the
committee by Chuck Ludlam) (They say, “Look what happened to Bayer,” which was subject to
virtual expropriation of its antibiotic, Cipro, by HHS following the 2001 anthrax attack. In fact,
the outrageous actions of HHS in that case have plagued our ability to engage this industry in
this research. We must have credible Administration officials state categorically that these
Mafioso tactics will never ever be seen again against a company that develops countermeasures
for infectious pathogens. The companies must be rewarded, not vilified.)). See also Cynthia M.
Ho, Inoculation Inventions: The Interplay of Infringement and Immunity in the Development of
Biodefense Vaccines, 8 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 111, 113 (2005).
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drugs and vaccines. Wyeth spent millions defending lawsuits related to
its smallpox vaccines. 111 The fact that vaccines require animal testing
and cannot be ethically tested on humans make such concerns
particularly acute. 112 Fourth, the PHSBPRA did not reduce the lengthy
FDA approval process (which can take ten to fifteen years). 113 Fifth, the
failure of the procurement contract, whereby the small biotechnology
firm VaxGen agreed to provide millions of doses of an unproven
anthrax vaccine, deterred other small (and large) private companies
from collaborating with the government. 114
111 See Temko, supra note 108, at 10–11 (“Wyeth started making smallpox vaccine in 1885
and was a principle [sic] supplier of childhood vaccines in the United States for most of the
20th Century. But beginning in the 1980s, it became the target of lawsuits linking vaccines to a
wide range of illnesses without obvious causes, such as epilepsy and attention deficit disorder.
Wyeth estimates the industry has spent more than $200 million defending itself against
hundreds of lawsuits alleging that a preservative in some vaccines called thimerosal causes
autism and other diseases.”).
112 See id. at 11–13; see also James T. O’Reilly, Bombing Bureaucratic Complacency: Effects of
Counter-Terrorism Pressure upon Medical Product Approvals, 60 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 329,
336 n.33 (2004) (“This uncertainty is inherent in the antidote research effort, but it makes the
investor less willing to support the development costs and it expands the company’s liability
concerns.”).
113 See Temko, supra note 108, at 12–13; PETER BARTON HUTT & RICHARD A. MERRILL,
FOOD AND DRUG LAW, CASES AND MATERIALS 514 (2d ed. 1991); Janene Boyce, Disclosure of
Clinical Trial Data: Why Exemption 4 of the Freedom of Information Act Should Be Restored,
2005 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 3, 8. See also James Thuo Gathii, Rights, Patents, Markets and the
Global AIDS Pandemic, 14 FLA. J. INT’L L. 261, 340 (2002) (“The foregoing process of drug
approval takes at least seven years.”); Crossing the Valley of Death: Bringing Promising Medical
Countermeasures to BioShield: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Bioterrorism and Pub. Health
Preparedness of the Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor & Pensions, 109th Cong. 17 (2005)
(“[F]ewer than one in one hundred candidate drugs will receive approval by the FDA for
Investigational New Drug (IND) status, and of those, only about one in four will receive
approval by the FDA. Second, once a product receives IND approval, it may take 8–10 years
and $500–$800 million or more to support the clinical trials and development manufacturing
processes to bring a product to market. This does not include the research investment to
develop candidate products.”) (prepared statement of Colonel Joseph Palma, M.D., USAF). As
discussed infra note 294, there is precedent for providing expedited review for orphan drugs
and drugs for neglected diseases through the use of tradeable vouchers.
114 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-08-88, PROJECT BIOSHIELD: ACTIONS
NEEDED TO AVOID REPEATING PAST PROBLEMS WITH PROCURING NEW ANTHRAX VACCINE
AND MANAGING THE STOCKPILE OF LICENSED VACCINE (2007), https://www.gao.gov/assets/
270/268295.pdf [https://perma.cc/W7DG-L4VA]. According to the U.S. Government
Accountability Office:

Three major factors contributed to the failure of the first Project BioShield
procurement effort for an rPA anthrax vaccine. First, HHS’s Office of the Assistant
Secretary for Preparedness and Response (ASPR) awarded the procurement contract

Bagley.Beck.40.2.7 (Do Not Delete)

2018]

1/17/2019 6:14 PM

P R E P A R I N G F O R T H E A P O C A L YP S E

855

Sixth, the PHSBPRA did not reduce the bureaucratic governmental
red tape private firms had to cut through to finalize the government
procurement contracts. Indeed, private executives complained that
government officials were changing the requirements and delaying
contracts. 115 Seventh, the PHSBPRA failed to establish an effective
delivery system for the distribution of drugs and vaccines in a largescale crisis even if it had an adequate supply stockpiled. 116 Finally, Eliah
Zerhouni and Anthony Fauci, the directors of the NIH and National
Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID), were criticized for
putting too much emphasis on government research.
C.

BARDA and OTA

To address the shortfalls of the BioShield program and further
encourage the development and procurement of CBRN medical
countermeasures, Congress passed the Pandemic and All-Hazards
Preparedness Act (PAHPA) in 2006. PAHPA created the Biomedical
Advanced Research and Development Authority (BARDA) and
established the position of Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and
Response in the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS).
to VaxGen, a small biotechnology firm, while VaxGen was still in the early stages of
developing a vaccine and had not addressed many critical manufacturing issues. This
award preempted critical development work on the vaccine. Also, the contract
required VaxGen to deliver 25 million doses of the vaccine in 2 years, which would
have been unrealistic even for a larger manufacturer. Second, VaxGen took
unrealistic risks in accepting the contract terms. VaxGen officials told GAO that they
accepted the contract despite significant risks due to (1) the aggressive delivery time
line for the vaccine, (2) VaxGen’s lack of in-house technical expertise—a condition
exacerbated by the attrition of key company staff as the contract progressed—and (3)
VaxGen’s limited options for securing any additional funding needed. Third,
important Food and Drug Administration (FDA) requirements regarding the type of
data and testing required for the rPA anthrax vaccine to be eligible for use in an
emergency were not known at the outset of the procurement contract. In addition,
ASPR’s anticipated use of the rPA anthrax vaccine was not articulated to all parties
clearly enough and evolved over time. Finally, according to VaxGen, the purchase of
BioThrax for the stockpile as a stopgap measure raised the bar for the VaxGen
vaccine. All these factors created confusion over the acceptance criteria for VaxGen’s
product and significantly diminished VaxGen’s ability to meet contract time lines.
Id.
115
116

See Temko, supra note 108, at 34–35.
See id. at 39.
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Since then, BARDA has made substantial progress closing the
innovation gap by stimulating R&D through public-private partnerships
with various stakeholders, including industry.
1.

Other Transaction Authority

Since 2013, BARDA has provided non-dilutive funding and
technical advisory support to its partners pursuant to a flexible
government contracting vehicle, the OTA. 117 OTA collaborators are not
required to comply with the typical lengthy and time-consuming
procurement requirements or to change their standard business
practices. 118 Given the flexibility inherent in collaborations governed by
OTA, the federal government can also accommodate the various
licensing (and collaboration) terms and conditions that a company may
already have in place with its partners, including licensors’ account
rights. 119
When using its OTA, BARDA is not required to comply with the
multitude of laws, regulations, and other requirements that normally
apply to standard procurement contracts, grants, and cooperative
agreements. As a result, the turnaround time is shorter, “with less
internal paperwork than normally would be the case.” 120 Thus, used
correctly, OTA contracts can attract leading-edge, biotech and
pharmaceutical companies and academics to collaborate with federal
funding agencies to participate in BARDA-funded R&D programs in
situations where they otherwise would not do so.
OTA arrangements permit BARDA to take the “portfolio
approach” that industry and venture capitalists use to fund R&D by
diversifying investments, funding multiple rounds dependent upon
success, 121 and not trying to pick a national champion. 122 BARDA is
See Kuyath, supra note 34, at 522–24.
Id. at 536.
119 See id. at 523.
120 See id. at 524; see also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-16-209, FEDERAL
ACQUISITIONS: USE OF ‘OTHER TRANSACTION’ AGREEMENTS LIMITED AND MOSTLY FOR
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES (2016), https://www.gao.gov/assets/680/674534.pdf
[https://perma.cc/PP5A-K4Y2] (“[A]gencies told GAO the authority allowed them to develop
customized agreements . . . . This flexibility allowed agencies to address concerns regarding
intellectual property and cost accounting provisions . . . .”).
121 See BAGLEY & DAUCHY, supra note 94, at 438–95.
117
118
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accordingly able to support a “company’s [and the government’s] effort
to simultaneously and in parallel develop multiple drug candidates.” 123
2.

Use of OTA to Form Public-Private Partnerships

Both DARPA and BARDA have used OTA to establish publicprivate partnerships to deal with technological challenges. Publicprivate partnerships are “contractual agreements between a public
agency or public-sector authority and a private-sector entity that allow
for greater private participation in the delivery of public services, or in
developing an environment that improves the quality of life for the
general public.” 124 In order to develop a public-private partnership, 125
the conventional community of stakeholders is expanded to include the
private sector (emerging and established firms); management; academia
and research communities; industry and economic development
organizations; federal, state, regional, and local governments; and the
financial sector, including investment banks, angel groups, and venture
capital groups. This is in addition to the traditional stakeholder groups,
which include customers, employees, creditors, suppliers, and
shareholders.
Agreements reached through the use of a government agency’s
OTA have formed the basis for pharmaceutical public-private
partnerships with large pharmaceutical companies, such as
GlaxoSmithKline (2013), AstraZeneca (2015), the Medicines Company

122 See Christopher Houchens & Joseph Larsen, The Role of the Biomedical Advanced
Research and Development Authority (BARDA) in Promoting Innovation in Antibacterial
Product Development, AMR CONTROL (Aug. 2, 2017), http://resistancecontrol.info/2017/therole-of-the-biomedical-advanced-research-and-development-authority-barda-in-promotinginnovation-in-antibacterial-product-development [https://perma.cc/C535-H38N].
123 Id. (“Such portfolio-based funding is also more consistent with industry practice and
reduces technical risk by allowing for the reallocation of resources across activities and among
drug candidates if technical or business risks materialize, thereby increasing the probability of
bringing a successful drug to market.”).
124 Louis Witters et al., The Role of Public-Private Partnerships in Driving Innovation, in THE
GLOBAL INNOVATION INDEX 2012: STRONGER INNOVATION LINKAGES FOR GLOBAL GROWTH 81
(Soumitra Dutta ed., 2012), https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/userfiles/file/GII-2012Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/NN2E-MRWE].
125 Anat Alon-Beck developed the Coalition Model in her dissertation. See Alon-Beck, supra
note 23.
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and Hoffmann-La Roche (both 2016), and Pfizer (2017). 126 OTAs have
also been used to enter into international collaborations with other
funding agencies, such as the European Union’s IMI (to co-fund the
development of one of AstraZeneca’s lead antibacterial candidates), and
to jointly support other product development. 127 Finally, OTA contracts
have made it possible for the U.S. government and its contractors to
enter into consortiums. 128
For example, as discussed further below, 129 BARDA and the NIH’s
NIAID used OTA to create the Global Combating Antibiotic Resistant
126 See Michael J. Eichberg, Public Funding of Clinical-Stage Antibiotic Development in the
United States and European Union, 13 HEALTH SECURITY 156 (2015), https://www.ncbi.nlm.
nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4486734/pdf/hs.2014.0081.pdf [https://perma.cc/6TTH-QN6Y]; see
Houchens & Larsen, supra note 122.
127 As Bagley & Tvarnø explain:

The IMI acts as a neutral third party supporting open-source, public-private research
projects in the EU involving large biopharmaceutical companies that are members of
the EFPIA, small and medium enterprises, patients’ organizations, universities, other
research organizations, hospitals, and regulatory agencies with the aim of improving
drug development. The IMI is governed by Council Regulation (EC) No. 73/2008 on
the establishment of the IMI Joint Undertaking (IMI-JU), the IMIJU financial rules,
as well as other European Community and European Union law. The IMI grant
agreement of 2011 comprises eleven articles and several appendices concerning the
parties, research management, the scope and duration of the project, reports, budget
and financial contribution, communication, applicable law and the competent court
of jurisdiction. The grant agreement allows introduction of special clauses but does
not itself include clauses promoting joint utility.
Bagley & Tvarnø, supra note 16, at 400. See, e.g., Council Regulation 73/2008, Setting Up the
Joint Undertaking for the Implementation of the Joint Technology Initiative on Innovative
Medicines, 2008 O.J. (L 30) 38 (EC); IMI Joint Undertaking Model Grant Agreement Core 3–4,
https://www.imi.europa.eu/sites/default/files/uploads/documents/apply-for-funding/calldocuments/imi1/IMI_Grant_Agreement_rev2011_Core.pdf [https://perma.cc/U2A8-MFD2].
On joint support of other product development, see Houchens & Larsen, supra note 122.
128 See, e.g., DoD Seeks to Establish Consortium for CBRN Countermeasures, Diagnostics,
GLOBAL BIODEFENSE (May 20, 2015), https://globalbiodefense.com/2015/05/20/dod-seeks-toestablish-consortium-for-cbrn-countermeasures-diagnostics
[https://perma.cc/UYR6-B4T8]
(“The DoD’s Joint Project Manager for Medical Countermeasure Systems (JPM-MCS), part of
the Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical and Biological Defense, is seeking to establish
a consortium for advanced development efforts to support defense medical pharmaceutical and
diagnostic requirements.”); see also Special Operations Forces Countering Weapons of Mass
Destruction OTA, CBRNE CENT. (Aug. 30, 2017), https://cbrnecentral.com/special-operationsforces-countering-weapons-mass-destruction-ota/10789 [https://perma.cc/SVC2-W4X8] (“The
U.S. Army has released a competitive solicitation to establish an agreement with a single new or
established consortium to develop and mature technologies which support Countering
Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD).”).
129 See infra text accompanying notes 210–13.
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Bacteria Biopharmaceutical Accelerator (CARB-X). 130 In another effort
“to accelerate research, development, and availability of transformative
countermeasures to protect Americans,” BARDA announced the
creation of the Division of Research, Innovation, and Ventures (DRIVe)
in June 2018. 131 According to Steve Brozak:
Unlike the current funding mechanisms the government uses, it
seems that DRIVe will act more like a strategic investor in private
and public companies in addition to being a grant maker. This means
that the new division may be able to make direct investments into
companies BARDA would like to partner with and derive value by
holding equity or equity-like instruments in the venture. Investing in
opportunities in this manner offers a pathway to renew funds to
reinvest into other ventures deemed essential to the national
interest. 132

Notwithstanding the promise of initiatives like CARB-X and DRIVe, the
federal government’s policies in effect since 2001 133 have not provided
sufficient incentives for private biotechnology and pharmaceutical
companies to engage in the development of countermeasures, with few
companies advancing “candidates through clinical trials, and fewer
still . . . likely to market products.” 134

130 Gates Foundation, UK Commit Nearly $52 Million to Fight Superbugs, PHILANTHROPY
NEWS DIG. (May 23, 2018), http://philanthropynewsdigest.org/news/gates-foundation-ukcommit-nearly-52-million-to-fight-superbugs [https://perma.cc/RZ6J-PJN4] [hereinafter Gates
Foundation].
131 Steve Brozak, An Unlikely Biotech Investor: The Government, FORBES (June 8, 2018, 9:14
AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/stephenbrozak/2018/06/08/merck-and-achaogen-twocompanies-working-with-barda-to-fight-emerging-health-threats/#686518984fd0 [https://
perma.cc/H4DZ-LNHE].
132 Id.
133 See Matheny et al., supra note 12, at 228–31; see also Clarence Lam et al., Billions for
Biodefense: Federal Agency Biodefense Funding, FY2006–FY2007, 4 BIOSECURITY &
BIOTERRORISM: BIODEFENSE STRATEGY, PRAC., & SCI. 113 (2006).
134 See Matheny et al., supra note 12, at 228 (“Out of 11 requests for proposals issued by the
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) for biodefense countermeasures, only six
products have been procured—none from a large pharmaceutical firm.”); see also id. tbl.2;
Melanie C. Trull et al., Turning Biodefense Dollars into Products, 25 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY
179, 180 (2007); U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., PROJECT BIOSHIELD ANNUAL REPORT
TO CONGRESS: AUGUST 2006–JULY 2007 5 (2007).

Bagley.Beck.40.2.7 (Do Not Delete)

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

860
D.

1/17/2019 6:14 PM

[Vol. 40:823

The Model State Emergency Health Powers Act

Following the events of 9/11, the Center for Law and the Public’s
Health at Georgetown University and Johns Hopkins University
prepared and published a Model State Emergency Health Powers Act
(MSEHPA). 135 As a result of public criticism, 136 they subsequently
introduced a second draft. 137 As of July 1, 2004, thirty-four states and
the District of Columbia had enacted some form of the MSEHPA, and it
was under consideration by another nine states. 138 As with the first
version, various civil rights groups criticized the second draft for
providing excessive powers to state governors at the expense of
individual rights, and for allocating primary responsibility for
responding to a bioterrorism attack to underfunded and undertrained
individual state health departments ill-equipped to manage the aftereffects of such an attack. 139 We agree that a national response regime is
necessary.
III. DEFENSE OF HEALTH COUNTERMEASURES INITIATIVE
We call on the U.S. government to build on the success of DARPA
and BARDA and the effective use of OTA to establish the Defense of
Health Countermeasures Initiative. The DHCI builds on the concept
that the government needs to be a key risk-taker and invest in

MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS ACT (THE CTR. FOR LAW & THE PUB.’S
HEALTH AT GEORGETOWN & JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVS., Proposed Draft Oct. 23, 2001), https://
biotech.law.lsu.edu/blaw/bt/MSEHPA.pdf [https://perma.cc/K6KN-EMXW].
136 See Model State Emergency Health Powers Act, AM. C.L. UNION, https://www.aclu.org/
other/model-state-emergency-health-powers-act [https://perma.cc/BJW9-UMM4] (last visited
Oct. 4, 2018); Model State Emergency Health Powers Act (MSEHPA), NAT’L VACCINE INFO.
CTR.,
https://www.nvic.org/Vaccine-Laws/model-state-emergency-health-powers-act.aspx
[https://perma.cc/5RBA-F545](last visited Oct. 4, 2018).
137 MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS ACT (THE CTR. FOR LAW & THE PUB.’S
HEALTH AT GEORGETOWN & JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVS., Discussion Draft Dec. 21, 2001), http://
www.aapsonline.org/legis/msehpa2.pdf [https://perma.cc/NHW4-RKB5].
138 Matthew E. Brown, Reconsidering the Model State Emergency Health Powers Act: Toward
State Regionalization in Bioterrorism Response, 14 ANNALS HEALTH L. 95, 97 (2005), https://
lawecommons.luc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1204&context=annals [https://perma.cc/
GW28-5AK2].
139 Id.
135
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knowledge, human capital, and innovation to encourage knowledge
spillovers. 140
The DHCI includes the creation of a public-private network of
“ecosystems of excellence,” 141 comprising triads of universities and other
research institutions, private pharmaceutical and biotechnology firms
and private investors, and government actors, to form incubators for the
development of effective CBRN countermeasures (Incubators or
DHCIIs). The DHCI is designed to complement, and not to replace, the
private market efforts in financing and growing emerging growth firms,
new technology, and applications. It allows the government to make
direct equity investments in seed projects (ideas that are promising
bases for a new company or expansion of an existing firm) within a
short period of time (usually within two but sometimes within up to five
years), while also encouraging private intermediaries to participate in
the financing and management of the funded companies.
Precedents include the National Science Foundation’s UniversityIndustry Demonstration Partnership and the NIH’s Roadmap
Initiatives, which have been “integral to engaging academia in drug
discovery research and have been effectively leveraged to help bridge the
chasm between basic research activities and the commercialization of a
drug.”142 More recently, in 2012, the Obama Administration created
Partnerships to Accelerate Therapeutics “to identify and resolve
bottlenecks and speed the development of life-saving medicines through
synergistic alliances involving industry, academia, government, and
disease foundations.” 143

See AUDRETSCH, supra note 74, at 9–10; LERNER, supra note 24, at 13, 71.
See Teece, supra note 24, at 104; see also Mike Alvarez Cohen, Strategies for Developing
University Innovation Ecosystems: An Analysis, Segmentation and Frame-Work Based on
Somewhat Non-Intuitive and Slightly Controversial Findings, 51 LES NOUVELLES 184 (2016)
(defining “university innovation ecosystems” as “applied research, entrepreneurship education,
technology transfer, idea incubators, startup accelerators, new venture competitions, mentor
networks, industry collaborations, and venture capital resources”). Cohen found that “the top
ecosystems have strong pools of innovative and entrepreneurial students, faculty and staff” and
“relatively decentralized entrepreneurship-related activities, not top-down centralized control
of activities.” Id. at 185. For a discussion of the cybersecurity ecosystem of excellence in San
Diego, California, see infra note 277.
142 Chaguturu, supra note 1, at xxi.
143 Id. at xx.
140
141
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Technology Innovation and Business Incubators: In General

A key element of the DHCI is the use of technology innovation and
business incubators to encourage innovation by serving the needs of
entrepreneurs (and seed stage companies) and by providing them with
access to the resources required to successfully grow their ideas. 144
Joseph Mancuso established the first U.S. business incubator, the
Batavia Industrial Center in Batavia, New York, in 1959. 145 For the
purpose of this Article, the term “business incubator program” is taken
from the working definition provided by David A. Lewis, Elsie HarperAnderson, and Lawrence A. Molnar, to mean the following:
Business incubation programs are designed to accelerate the
successful development of entrepreneurial companies through an
array of business support resources and services, developed or
orchestrated by the incubator manager, and offered both in the
incubator and through its network of contacts. A business incubation
program’s main goal is to produce successful firms that will leave the
program financially viable and freestanding. Critical to the definition
of an incubator is the provision of management guidance, technical
assistance, and consulting tailored to the needs of new enterprises. 146

As of 2014, there were an estimated 7,000 incubators worldwide. 147
There are different forms of technology and business incubators,
which can generally be divided into four types, ranging from “virtual
incubators” 148 (with no walls), “incubators with walls,” 149 and

144 The use of the “technology business incubators” as a strategic development tool in the
United States became popular in the mid-1980s.
145 See LEWIS, HARPER-ANDERSON & MOLNAR, supra note 76, at 13 (“The first U.S. business
incubator opened in 1959, when Joseph Mancuso started the Batavia Industrial Center in
Batavia, New York. Since that time, business incubation programs have emerged as successful
economic development tools throughout the country and around the world. As of October
2006, approximately 1,400 business incubators operated in North America, including 1,115 in
the U.S.”).
146 Id. at 5.
147 Bjørn Petter Bjercke, Business Incubators as a Resource Provider 1 (July 2015)
(unpublished thesis, Norwegian University of Science and Technology), https://
brage.bibsys.no/xmlui/bitstream/handle/11250/2364869/13128_FULLTEXT.pdf?sequence=1
[https://perma.cc/PFG4-CGVA].
148 See LEWIS, HARPER-ANDERSON & MOLNAR, supra note 76, at 15. The terms “virtual
incubators” and “[i]ncubators without walls” are synonymous. These incubators are:
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“accelerators,” 150 to “international incubators.”151 For the reasons set
forth in Section III.C below, we recommend incubators with walls, that
is, incubators with shared-use facilities.

[B]usiness incubators that do not offer on-site space for clients, although they may
have a central office to coordinate services, house the management staff, meet with
clients, and perhaps even provide conference rooms for clients. Virtual incubators
may or may not be located in the same geographic area as their client companies,
since a virtual presence is what defines an incubator without walls. Virtual
incubation programs tend to be less expensive to operate than traditional business
incubators that have additional expenses related to the operation and management of
a physical plant. In rural areas—where the client base is often spread out over large
areas, making commutes difficult—virtual incubation may be a good alternative.
Also, some entrepreneurs prefer not to locate in an incubator facility because they
already have established offices elsewhere or need access to specialized equipment or
facilities not present in the incubator. For these firms, virtual incubation or
participation in an affiliate program at an incubation program with walls is a better
option. One significant challenge of virtual incubation is encouraging networking
among clients. Having strong networks provides an environment that facilitates peerto-peer learning, mutual support, and potential collaboration, as well as
camaraderie—all of which are critical to client success. In addition, having clients
located in close proximity within the incubator facility makes it easier for the
incubator staff to deliver entrepreneurial support services. Some have compared
virtual incubation with well-operated Small Business Development Centers. As with
incubators with walls, virtual business incubation programs also face significant
funding challenges.
Id.

149 See id. (“An incubator with walls is a business incubation program with a multitenant
business incubator facility and on-site management. Although an incubator with walls offers
entrepreneurs space in which to operate their businesses, the focus of the program remains on
the business assistance services provided to the start-ups, not on the building itself.”).
150 See id. at 16 (stating that there is no definitive definition of business accelerator in the
literature). The term may be generally defined

either as: (1) a late-stage incubation program, assisting entrepreneurial firms that are
more mature and ready for external financing; or (2) a facility that houses a modified
business incubation program designed for incubator graduates as they ease into the
market. A third definition—which is both more expansive and less measurable—is
similar to the virtual incubator model. Finally, some industry professionals use the
terms business incubator and business accelerator interchangeably.
Id. In this Article, we use the definition provided by Cohen, Bingham, and Hallen: accelerators,
such as Y Combinator (Silicon Valley) and Techstars (Boston, Boulder, London, and Seattle),
are “short-term, limited duration, cohort-based educational programs for nascent ventures”
that provide intense and quick mentoring for entrepreneurs who start and end the program
together. Susan L. Cohen, Christopher B. Bingham & Benjamin L. Hallen, The Role of
Accelerator Designs in Mitigating Bounded Rationality in New Ventures, ADMIN. SCI. Q. (July
2018), at 1, 3, 5–6, http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0001839218782131 [https://
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For example, the University of Connecticut’s Technology
Incubation Program (TIP) operates two of the largest incubators in the
United States, one in Farmington, Connecticut, next to its medical,
nursing, and dental schools, specializing in life sciences, and a second
near its main campus in Storrs, Connecticut, specializing in computer
science and related high technology. TIP offers:
[1] Incubator facilities featuring wet labs and access to
instrumentation
[2] Collaboration with Scientific Experts
[3] Technically trained employees, fellows, interns and
graduates
[4] The university’s world-class library resources [and]
[5] Customized business planning and mentoring. 152

perma.cc/ZM86-2WPA]. An accelerator can have cohorts ranging from 6 to 125 start-ups. Id.
at 6. Typically, the accelerator receives 6–8% of the equity of each participant in exchange for a
$15,000 to $20,000 cash investment. Id. Since the first accelerator in the United States was
created in 2005, approximately 6,000 start-ups nurtured in 650 accelerators have collectively
raised more than $30 billion in capital. Id. at 5–6.
151 There appears to be no clear and generally accepted definition of the terms “international
business incubator” or “international accelerator” in the literature. Additionally, there is scant
empirical research or evaluation of these models. LEWIS, HARPER-ANDERSON & MOLNAR, supra
note 76, at 16. As Lewis, Harper-Anderson, and Molnar explain, an international form of
business incubation program has recently emerged to help foreign firms to enter the U.S.
market:
[I]nternational business incubators provide the same set of entrepreneurial services
as a typical incubator, but they concentrate on providing a “soft landing” for
international firms that want to access U.S. markets, partner with U.S. firms, or
access other resources. Some specialized services offered by international incubators
that are above and beyond typical business incubation services include translation
services, language training, help obtaining business and driver’s licenses, cultural
training, immigration and visa assistance, and housing assistance. Immigration
services are often extended to trailing spouses and children, making it easier for
foreign entrepreneurs to settle into their new location.
Id. at 16–17.
152 Wet Labs & Offices, UNIVERSITY OF CONNECTICUT: OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT FOR
RESEARCH, https://tip.uconn.edu/availablespace [https://perma.cc/3DW8-8B9Q] (last visited
Oct. 4, 2018). There are also resident entrepreneurs and legal counsel available to assist the
startups. Telephone Interview by Constance E. Bagley with Mostafa Analoui, Executive
Director, Venture Development at the University of Connecticut’s Technology Incubation
Program (April 9, 2018).
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The Israeli Technology Incubator Program

The Israeli government, acting through the Israeli Office of the
Chief Scientist (OCS), established the Technology Incubator Program
whereby it created twenty-eight technology incubators with shared-use
facilities between the years of 1991 and 1993. 153 Designed to help build
successful firms that could leave the incubator in relatively short order
in a financially and organizationally self-sustained and viable state, 154
the program spurred the innovation and cross-fertilization necessary to
develop Israel’s high technology industry. 155 It also provided
employment for the engineers and scientists who had immigrated to
Israel from the former Soviet Union, 156 as well as laid-off engineers from
the military sector. 157 By providing shared-use facilities and short-term
financial and other support to individuals and early-stage companies
with a promising idea, 158 the incubators “transformed” engineers into
technological entrepreneurs. 159 Finally, the program forged links and

See Frenkel et al., infra note 155, at 189.
Manuel Trajtenberg, R&D Policy in Israel: An Overview and Reassessment 10 (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7930, 2000). As Trajtenberg explained:
153
154

[The] premise is that the technological incubator would significantly enhance the
entrepreneur’s prospects of raising further capital, finding strategic partners, and
emerging from the incubator with businesses that can stand on their own. Of course,
this initial stage is the riskiest, and certainly in the early 1990s there were virtually no
other sources of finance in Israel for such ventures.
Id.

See Amnon Frenkel et al., Public Versus Private Technological Incubator Programmes:
Privatizing the Technological Incubators in Israel, 16 EUR. PLAN. STUD. 189 (2005).
156 See id. According to Trajtenberg:
155

Many of these immigrants were scientists and skilled professionals that came to Israel
with highly valuable human capital as well as with plenty of ideas for innovative
products. However, they were lacking in virtually all other dimensions required for
commercial success, from knowledge of the relevant languages (e.g. Hebrew and
English) and of commercial practices in western economies, to managerial skills and
access to capital. Even though it targeted new immigrants, the program is open to all.
Trajtenberg, supra note 154, at 10.
157 See DANIEL SHEFER & AMNON FRENKEL, AN EVALUATION OF THE ISRAELI
TECHNOLOGICAL INCUBATOR PROGRAM AND ITS PROJECTS 2–3 (2002), http://ifise.unipv.it/
Download/final-draft3.pdf [https://perma.cc/KW4V-2QX5].
158 In Israel, incubators usually provide seed capital to entrepreneurs, whereas venturecapital funds provide start-up capital to an existing firm. Id. at 3.
159 See id. at 2–3.
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promoted cooperation among entrepreneurs, academic institutions,
private industry, and government procurement officials. 160 The
incubators had no industrial sector designation or limitation, and any
university or research institution, local municipality, or large private
firm could sponsor a project. 161 Their geographic locations ranged from
metropolitan areas to more remote regions. 162
Each incubator’s manager, often with the assistance of a group of
professional advisors, was responsible for selecting eight to twelve
projects from multiple applicants who were subject to a rigorous
screening process. 163 To be accepted, the idea underlying the project had
to be based on innovative R&D that was capable of being
commercialized and exported to an appropriate market within a
reasonable period of time. 164
1.

Governance

Initially, the Israeli technology incubators were organized as notfor-profit quasi-governmental entities. 165 They were governed by an
incubator manager, as well as by public actors, such as government
officials, municipalities, research institutions, and universities. 166
160 The academic peer review of the research underlying the applicants’ proposals helped the
incubator’s managers gauge whether the idea or project in question could be commercialized in
a timely manner, thereby strengthening the relationship between academic research and private
industry.
161 See SHEFER & FRENKEL, supra note 157, at 3.
162 See id. at 4. As Frenkel et al. explain:

The aim of the technological incubator programme, as a development programme
“from below”, is to foster entrepreneurial activities from the very beginning of a
project’s initiation. Therefore, the incubator has the advantages and drawbacks
typical of this kind of programme. It can help to create a healthy entrepreneurial
culture by empowering local people and encouraging them to develop their own
firms locally. A technological incubator located in a remote region may be able to
provide a number of functions that are seldom found in peripheral areas, such as VC
supply, business and legal consultation, and the filtering of valuable ideas. Obviously,
however, it cannot help in increasing the supply of skilled labour.
Frenkel et al., supra note 155, at 192–93.
163 See SHEFER & FRENKEL, supra note 157, at 3.
164 See id. at 11.
165 Catarina Wylie, Vision in Venture: Israel’s High-Tech Incubator Program, 10 CELL CYCLE
855 (2011).
166 See SHEFER & FRENKEL, supra note 157, at 3–4.
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Following the selection process, the incubator’s manager and its
professional advisors were responsible for working with the
entrepreneur 167 to draft a “project folder,” which was then submitted to
the incubator’s steering committee for approval. 168 The steering
committee was typically chaired by the incubator’s manager and usually
comprised members from the following stakeholder groups: research
institutions and academia, industry representatives, and community
leaders. 169
2.

Financing Mechanisms and Services Provided

The Israeli government provided financial support both to the
incubator’s management, as well as to the program’s participants.
Annual grants to the incubator’s management of up to $175,000 per
year were available. 170 The government also provided grants of up to
$150,000 per year, for a maximum of two years, to each seed company
participating in the program. 171
Subject to that upper limit of $150,000, the Israeli government
limited the grants it allocated to each seed company to not more than
85% of that company’s approved project budget. 172 As a result, the
entrepreneur was responsible for obtaining non-government financing
for the remaining 15% of the project budget, termed the
“complementary financing.” 173 The entrepreneur could (1) contribute
that amount directly to the project, (2) raise that amount from a nongovernment party, or (3) provide some combination of self-funding and
non-governmental financing. 174 Research in 2003 showed that founders
167 The entrepreneur seeking approval of a project to commercialize a promising idea often
will not have formed a separate entity, such as a corporation, before being accepted by the
incubator. Id. at 3–4. When able to afford to pay the organizational costs, the entrepreneur may
form a start-up firm with minimal capital before applying to the incubator. In this Article, we
use the terms “entrepreneur,” “founder,” “seed company,” “fledgling company,” and “start-up”
interchangeably unless the context clearly requires otherwise.
168 Id. at 3.
169 Id.
170 Id.
171 Id.
172 See Frenkel et al., supra note 155, at 193.
173 Id.
174 Id. (“From a small annual budget of $2 million at the beginning in 1991, the
technological incubator programme increased its annual budget to $32 million in 2002. As of
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had successfully obtained non-government financing for their incubator
projects from private investors in exchange for a share of the equity in
the project and by collecting fees from “royalties, sale of shares and
dividends, and strategic partnerships.” 175
If the “incubated” firm was successful in commercializing its
project, then it was obligated to repay the government “priming” grant
by paying royalties to the Israeli government. If a new venture failed,
however, then neither the entrepreneur nor the entity formed to pursue
the project was required to repay the money the government had
contributed to the project. 176
3.

Annual Evaluations and Possibility of Additional Governmental
Support in Rare Cases

Each of the projects accepted into the incubator program was
evaluated on a yearly basis. As noted above, government funding and
other support were almost always limited to not more than two years
after the venture commenced operations. 177 In limited circumstances,
mainly when the evaluators concluded that the project was wellmanaged but was in a field like the biotech that required a longer

2003, total government grants to the programme amounted to $285 million . . . . At the end of
2003, more than 200 projects were in operation in incubators, which employed more than 2,000
workers. One third of the initiatives were based on ideas brought by new immigrants, all of
whom had an academic education (most with a Master’s or PhD degree).”).
175 See SHEFER & FRENKEL, supra note 157, at 55. Shefer and Frenkel assessed the successes
of the Israeli technological incubator Program in 2003, which was ten years following its
establishment. See Frenkel et al., supra note 155, at 193. They concluded that generally the
program had fulfilled its purpose, because approximately 86.4% of the projects (during the
years 1999–2001) had graduated from the program, and 78% of these projects were able to
secure immediate financial support. Id. According to Frenkel, Shefer, and Miller, these statistics
indicated that the programs were successful. Id. It should be noted, however, that incubators
located in geographic areas considered to be the periphery experienced lower levels and rates of
success than programs located in more central regions. Id. According to Frenkel, Shefer, and
Miller, these findings suggested that vast government support was still needed in the initial
stages of incubator programs. Id. However, government support in the programs can be
gradually reduced over time, especially once private financing sources are available. Id. Yet,
there is a caveat, as it appears that technological incubators located in peripheral regions
require more public support for a longer period of time than incubators located in central
regions of the country. Id.
176 See SHEFER & FRENKEL, supra note 157, at 15, 55.
177 See id. at 3–4.
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incubation period, then a third year of government support might be
granted. 178
4.

Privatization in 2002

The Israeli technological incubator program initiated in 1991 was
privatized in 2002 and converted into public-private partnerships,
which were organized in the form of incubator joint companies. 179 Once
the private sector was able to provide adequate private capital for the
incubators on reasonable terms, policy makers concluded that
government funding was no longer necessary. 180
The incubator joint company reduced its percentage of equity
shares (which were not tradable) by increasing capital from external
investment. 181 Wholly privately-owned incubator models then started to
emerge in Israel. 182
After the privatization, there was a dramatic rise in the success
rates of entrepreneurial firms that participated in the private or quasipublic technology incubator programs. 183 Success rates were measured
by the ability of entrepreneurial firms, after graduation from the
incubator program, to obtain subsequent funding as well as to continue
growing their operations. 184 Following graduation, many companies
were able to create more jobs and attract international venture capital
funds. 185
178
179
180

Id.
See Frenkel et al., supra note 155, at 194.
See id. According to Frenkel et al.:

Privatization means a reduction in the government’s role in producing goods and
services, as well as limiting its control and regulation of the economy. . . . It is
commonly understood that government usually does not manage its resources
efficiently. Therefore, public companies will be less efficient than private companies.
Thus, turning public companies into private enterprises could increase their
efficiency and, thereby, the efficiency of the whole economic system . . . . Results have
shown, though, that privatization increases efficiency and innovation if it is done in a
wise manner.
Id.
181
182
183
184
185

See id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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The Israeli government further privatized the programs by
establishing a franchise system, whereby the government licensed the
public and quasi-public incubators to experienced equity investment
firms. 186 Such firms extensively invested in the incubator start-up
projects, providing both capital and management support. 187 Since 2002,
the franchise model used a new repayment mechanism. 188 Originally,
the Israeli government provided funding for projects directly to the
public technological incubator program. 189 In that way, the program was
the agent in charge of transferring the government funding to the
individual companies. Moreover, the program, not the start-up firm,
was accountable for repaying the grant, usually within a four-year
period from the date in which the start-up firm graduated from the
program. 190 To guarantee that the money would be repaid, the Israeli
government held shares in each of the funded start-up firms. If the
incubator did not repay the grant on time, the government had the right
to decide whether or not to sell its stake in the start-up. According to
Yossi Smoler, Director of the Technological Incubators Program, the
repayment mechanism was “too complex and wasn’t something in
which the government wanted to be involved.” 191 Today, the
government allocates funds directly to the start-up company, and the
company pays off the amount via royalties and interest (usually 3–5% of
revenues plus a market rate of interest). 192
5.

Results

The Israeli technology incubator programs exceeded the initial
goals of their founders, facilitating the development of a world-class,
high-tech industry in Israel. The execution of the mission of the Office
of Chief Scientist (OCS) to encourage cross-regional cooperation on
innovation was and continues to be extremely successful. The OCS
continues to expand its R&D initiatives with international partners (via
Wylie, supra note 165, at 855–56 (quoting Yossi Smoler, Director of Israel’s
Technological Incubators Program).
187 Id.
188 Id.
189 Id. at 855–56.
190 Id. at 856.
191 Id. at 856.
192 Id.
186
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bilateral or multilateral cooperation) and contribute to the expansion of
global innovative markets. Among these expanding markets are the
United States, China, and India. 193
C.

Proposed Structure of DHCI Incubators

Each of the DHCI Incubators (DCHIIs) will have its own
differentiating characteristics, which will depend on its regional and
historical influences, as well as its stakeholders and purpose. 194 At a
minimum, as stated by Ferid Murad, Nobel Laureate in Physiology and
Medicine, “the collaborating parties must plan carefully, take the project
seriously, define who does what, and honor their commitments in a
timely fashion.” 195 Although no single incubator structure or practice
guarantees favorable results, we believe that, based on the Israeli
experience and others studied by a variety of academics, 196 the DHCIIs
should include the following features.
1.

Shared Use Facilities

The DHCIIs should typically be part of a shared-use facility, where
multiple founders of new ventures are physically located. Shared
physical space promotes networking, collaboration, and the transfer of
both information and tacit knowledge. 197
Many entrepreneurs lack the accumulated knowledge, deep
networks, and industry peer groups available to seasoned managers of
established firms. 198 To handle the uncertainties and complexities
193 The Israel Innovation Authority (formerly called “Matimop”), the Israeli Industry Center
for R&D, operates international R&D agreements on behalf of the OCS with Italy, Belgium,
Ireland, Germany, Holland, Spain, Portugal, Finland, France, Sweden, Denmark, India, Turkey,
Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, Greece, China, Russia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Ontario
(Canada), Maryland (U.S.), and Victoria (Australia). United States, ISR. INNOVATION
AUTHORITY, http://www.matimop.org.il/usa.html [https://perma.cc/F4VW-PB3T] (last visited
Oct. 4, 2018).
194 For more suggestions, see KAO, supra note 68.
195 Ferid Murad, Foreword, in Chaguturu, supra note 1, at xvii–xviii.
196 Including, especially, the survey and analysis by Lewis, Harper-Anderson, and Molnar of
the top performing incubation programs in the United States. LEWIS, HARPER-ANDERSON &
MOLNAR, supra note 76.
197 BJERCKE, supra note 147, at vi.
198 Cohen et al., supra note 150, at 4.
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inherent in many new ventures, entrepreneurs may overuse bounded
rationality, be too quick to reject alternative courses of action, and
“settle” for what seems like a “good enough” outcome; they may also
suffer from confirmation and other cognitive biases. 199 Cohen,
Bingham, and Hallen found, in a comparative study of accelerators, that
by front-loading and concentrating the provision of expert advice,
mentoring, and meetings with customers at the beginning of the
program, by promoting transparency and information sharing among
peer ventures in a cluster of innovation, and by standardizing focus,
mentor meetings, peer gatherings, and other activities, the designers of
accelerators were able to mitigate the adverse effects of oversized
reliance on bounded rationality. 200 We would expect a similar dynamic
to occur with incubators. 201
Consider, for example, LabCentral, in Cambridge, Massachusetts—
a shared-use, affordable, move-in-ready laboratory facility suitable for
early-stage biotech research. Its founding sponsors include Triumvirate
Environmental and Johnson & Johnson Innovation. It is a 70,000
square-foot facility in the heart of the Kendall Square, Cambridge,
biotech innovation hub—near Harvard University and the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)—and was designed as a
launchpad for high-potential life sciences and biotech start-ups. It offers
fully permitted laboratory and office space for as many as sixty startups, comprising approximately 200 scientists and entrepreneurs. It is a
private, nonprofit institution, funded in part by two $5 million grants
from the Massachusetts Life Sciences Center, with support from its real
estate partner, MIT. 202

199 Id. at 3–4. For a more detailed discussion of bounded rationality and the “satisficing” and
cognitive biases that can accompany it, see Herbert A. Simon, A Behavioral Model of Rational
Choice, 69 Q.J. ECON. 99 (1955); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under
Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCI. 1124 (1974).
200 Cohen et al., supra note 150.
201 Bjercke found that co-location does not guarantee collaboration among incubatees in
part because collaboration requires mutual trust. BJERCKE, supra note 147, at vi. However, colocation, when coupled with “proactive and continuous coaching” and the promotion by the
incubator sponsor of knowledge sharing and collaboration among incubatees, resulted in
greater access to resources. Id.
202 This entire paragraph is drawn from What Is LabCentral?, LABCENTRAL https://
labcentral.org/about/what-is-labcentral [https://perma.cc/6XKF-MTZZ] (last visited Nov. 11,
2018).
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To quote Douglas Crawford, the associate director of a LabCentral
affiliate QB3@953:
Once [biotech entrepreneurs] are convinced that they should try to
bring their work to market, either with or without bridging-the-gap
funding, they are often astounded by the next mental adjustment: the
amount [of] effort required to turn their attractive innovation into a
useful product . . . .
Besides securing intellectual property and developing a business
plan, the budding entrepreneur must find a place[,] . . . supporting
services, and access to needed resources. 203

2.

Sponsors: DARPA and the Proposed Central Health Incubators
Bureau

The DHCI requires a federal government agency tasked with
spearheading the Initiative and setting up the Incubators in various
geographic regions across the United States. We recommend that
Congress authorize DARPA, with input from BARDA, the FDA, and
the NIH, to create the Central Health Incubators Bureau (CHIB). 204
CHIB will be in charge of heading the Initiative and making the final
decisions on the projects to be selected to participate in the various
Incubators. CHIB should include experts from the private and public
sectors, as well as nongovernmental organizations such as the American
Civil Liberties Union, the World Health Organization, and the Red
Cross. To avoid undue political interference, the members of CHIB
should be granted the sort of independent authority given to the
civilians chosen to determine which military bases should be closed after
Congress decided that the United States no longer needed as many bases
as it had during the Cold War. 205 Otherwise, each government official
would find it politically very difficult to vote to close the base in that
official’s own geographic district regardless of its importance to the
strategic defense of the United States.
203 Kenneth D. Harrison et al., Building a Life Sciences Innovation Ecosystem, 4 SCI.
TRANSLATIONAL MED. 1, 1–2 (2012).
204 This term is taken from the Israeli experience described supra in the text accompanying
notes 153–93.
205 Jim Garamone, Why Civilian Control of the Military?, U.S. DEP’T DEFENSE (May 2, 2001),
http://archive.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=45870 [https://perma.cc/PV84-WXWP].
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Stakeholder Engagement

The shared facilities should be designed to encourage cooperation
among not only the participating entrepreneurs but also between
entrepreneurs and various stakeholder groups in ecosystems of
excellence. 206 For the purpose of the Initiative, the term “stakeholders”
refers to the following groups of public and private partners that will
have a role in forming and operating the Incubator: management, the
private sector, academia, industry, government, the financial sector, and
other traditional stakeholders. 207 Accordingly, preferably, each
Incubator will be located near established pharmaceutical and biotech
firms, as well as research universities and other academic institutions
with strong life sciences, engineering, and business departments, and
will have access to military experts. As Robert Urban, Global Head of
Johnson & Johnson Innovation, explains, “success requires density and
proximity.” 208
For example, CARB-X, created pursuant to the Combating
Antibiotic Resistant Bacteria (CARB) plan President Obama released in
For a discussion of the Cyber Center of Excellence ecosystem in San Diego, California,
see infra note 277.
207 In 2009–2010, the U.S. Small Business Administration launched and provided $14.7
million in funding for a pilot program of ten contract-based innovation clusters in various
states. They ranged from agriculture innovation and autonomous systems and cybersecurity in
California to smart grid and efficient energy in Illinois to geospatial technology in Mississippi.
U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., OVERVIEW: SBA INNOVATION CLUSTERS (Nov. 12, 2013), http://
www.clustermapping.us/sites/default/files/files/page/Overview%20-%20SBA%20Innovation
%20Clusters.pdf [https://perma.cc/5GXF-A8GV]. In just two years, participants in the ten
clusters grew employment by 18%; increased revenues by 23%; raised more than $66 million in
outside financing from venture capitalists, angel investors, and lenders; and secured more than
$14 million in SBIR and STTR early-development awards. Id. at 5. In that same two-year
period, small businesses in the ten clusters won contracts and subcontracts worth more than
$807 million. Id. By 2013, the SBA and other agencies (including the Economic Development
Agency, the Employment and Training Agency, the U.S. Department of Energy, the
Environmental Protection Agency, the National Institute of Standards and Technology, and the
U.S. Department of Agriculture) had allocated a total of $214.6 million to fund fifty-six clusters
(including the ten pilot clusters) ranging from the Advanced Manufacturing Jobs Accelerator to
the Rural Jobs Accelerator. Id. at 2.
208 Telephone interview by Constance E. Bagley with Robert Urban, Global Head, Johnson &
Johnson Innovation, on February 26, 2018. For more information about Johnson & Johnson
Innovation and its incubators and partnerships, see About Us, JOHNSON & JOHNSON
INNOVATION, https://www.jnjinnovation.com/about-us [https://perma.cc/9LX7-LXER] (last
visited Oct. 4, 2018).
206
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2015, 209 “brings together leaders in industry, philanthropy, government,
and academia with the aim of rejuvenating the antimicrobial pipeline
for the next 25 years.” 210 Its participants include:
(1) BARDA and the NIH’s NIAID are the U.S.-sponsoring
governmental agencies.
(2) Kevin Outterson, a leading health law researcher at
Boston University who has collaborated in global projects
to address antibiotic resistance, is the Executive Director.
(3) The executive team “includes experts with decades of
experience in antibiotic drug development, including John
Rex, Senior Vice President at AstraZeneca,” and Barry
Eisenstein from Merck.
(4) NIAID “will provide in-kind services, including
preclinical services, to projects that CARB-X supports.
NIAID also is providing technical support for CARB-X
from their internal subject matter experts in early stage
antibiotic drug discovery and product development.”
(5) MassBio and the California Life Sciences Institute “will
provide world-class business support and mentoring
services to innovative product developers selected for
funding. The two accelerators will also share best practices
with the Wellcome Trust and AMR Centre.”
(6) The Broad Institute of MIT and Harvard University
“will host a new inter-disciplinary Collaborative Hub for
Early Antibiotic Discovery. This hub, aimed at early drug
discovery, will work with multiple academic programs to
advance promising antibiotic candidates that the CARB-X
initiative can pursue.”
(7) RTI International “will provide technical and regulatory
support services to product developers in the partner

209 Press Release, Office of the Press Sec’y, FACT SHEET: Obama Administration Releases
National Action Plan to Combat Antibiotic-Resistant Bacteria (Mar. 27, 2015), https://
obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/03/27/fact-sheet-obama-administrationreleases-national-action-plan-combat-ant [https://perma.cc/DFS2-G7PA]; see also HSS
Highlights Recent Progress Against Antibiotic Resistance, HEALIO (Nov. 17, 2017), https://
www.healio.com/infectious-disease/antimicrobials/news/online/%7B49c58212-a24a-467f-872b2ec69dafdfc8%7D/hss-highlights-recent-pro [https://perma.cc/3DZA-EPV9].
210 CARB-X Global Partnership, B.U. SCH. LAW, www.bu.edu/law/faculty-scholarship/carb-x
[https://perma.cc/8BV4-WUL3] (last visited Oct. 4, 2018).
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accelerators as well as build and run the computing systems
to identify, track, and monitor all research programs,
including a real-time dashboard management information
systems. RTI will evaluate all CARB-X operations to
identify and share best practices across all partners and
supporting continuous quality improvement.” 211 Two
nongovernmental organizations—the Bill and Melinda
Gates Foundation and the Wellcome Trust—will provide
funding and other support. 212
CARB-X has raised more than $500 million in funding and has more
than thirty-three projects underway. 213
4.

Structure of Incubators

The DHCIIs should be largely autonomous organizations, usually
structured as not-for-profit corporations, B corporations, or limited
liability companies with (1) limits on the transfer of equity ownership
and on the transfer or licensing of assets; and (2) the right to buy back
equity or reacquire assets and licensed rights at cost. Such ventures are
able to “lock in” their assets by protecting their stakeholders from the
risk of shareholders attempting to withdraw assets. 214
It should be noted that an incubator for life sciences will be
different from, say, a computer software incubator, both because the
time from invention to commercialization is much longer and because
the incubator will require academic peer review of marketable research
to gauge the safety and efficacy of an idea or a project. As a result, it
should reinforce the connection between academia and industry while
ensuring that funds are distributed to research projects that are deemed
worthy by scientists, not just business people seeking short-term
profits. 215
CARB-X, https://carb-x.org [https://perma.cc/8GG5-LTBR] (last visited Oct. 2, 2018).
Id.; Gates Foundation, supra note 130.
213 Gates Foundation, supra note 130. For more information about CARB-X, see CARB-X,
supra note 211.
214 See Lynn A. Stout, The Corporation as Time Machine: Intergenerational Equity,
Intergenerational Efficiency, and the Corporate Form, 38 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 685, 688–90 (2015).
Stout’s theory is discussed further infra in text accompanying notes 280–81.
215 See Block, supra note 34, at 175, 177 (according to Block, the NIH officials and policy
makers rely heavily on the peer review model, in which funds are distributed to research
211
212
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Financing

The DoD, the NIH, the CHIB, and other government agencies will
provide seed funding for projects accepted by a DHCI in response to
requests for proposals. Such grants will typically be limited to not more
than two years. 216 Because these projects are from the biotech field, a
third year of government support could be granted under special
circumstances and after due assessment. 217 In contrast, projects
supported by an accelerator would usually be funded for five months or
less. 218
Building on the Israeli incubator model, the funds should be
invested in the portfolio companies in the Incubator and not given to
the manager of the Incubator. However, in most cases, it will be the new
venture, and not the government, that will own the technology with
certain residual rights belonging to the academic institution and a
portion of the royalties being payable to the inventors in accordance
with the Bayh-Dole Act. The incubated firm will be required to repay
the government grant once successful, perhaps (if one follows the Israeli
model) with royalties equal to 3–5% of revenues plus market rate
interest. 219 If the new venture fails, however, then the government will
not require repayment of the grants. 220 Both the public and private
participants should understand and acknowledge that it is very likely
that entrepreneurs and start-up firms will fail several times before they
reach a successful outcome in the biotech industry.
It will usually be necessary to raise additional funding from various
local and regional stakeholder groups (such as colleges or universities,
other government agencies, economic development groups, private
industry, angel investors, venture capital and hedge funds, and any
other potential sponsors of the Incubator). According to a study by
Lewis, Harper-Anderson, and Molnar, public sector support contributes
projects that were deemed worthy by scientists); see also NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE
NAT’L ACADEMIES, AN ASSESSMENT OF THE SMALL BUSINESS INNOVATION RESEARCH PROGRAM
AT THE NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH (Charles W. Wessner ed., 2009), http://www.ncbi.
nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK11455.
216 See Israeli example discussed in SHEFER & FRENKEL, supra note 157, at 3.
217 See id. at 3–4. In theory, a fourth or fifth year of support might be provided.
218 Cohen et al., supra note 150, at 8.
219 See Israeli Incubator example in Wylie, supra note 165, at 856.
220 Id.
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to the success of projects nurtured in an incubator. 221 Moreover,
incubators that enjoy larger budgets (in terms of both revenues and
expenditures) outperform incubators that have to deal with budget
constraints. 222
Accordingly, the top managers of each Incubator should be
expected to work with the entrepreneurs to line up investments from
other private and public sources representing roughly 15% of each
portfolio company’s approved budget. 223 Getting private capital to
supplement the government investment will increase the total capital
introduced into the market, as well as provide networking opportunities
for the portfolio companies, which may result in follow-on investments
in the companies from such sources. As discussed below, the project
managers of the firms in the incubators should also be expected to
contribute funds, property, or sweat equity.
6.

Other Governmental Actors and their Roles

Governmental actors can perform various tasks. Regional, state,
and federal governments can generally be expected to provide R&D
grants and other funding. Various agencies, such as the DoD,
Department of Commerce (DOC), HHS, and Department of Labor, may
be called upon to oversee and help carry out initiatives and projects
221 See LEWIS, HARPER-ANDERSON & MOLNAR, supra note 76, at 8 (“[T]his research suggests
that some level of public sector investment contributes to greater incubator outcomes in terms
of job creation, graduation rates, etc.”).
222 According to Lewis, Harper-Anderson, and Molnar:

Programs with more financial resources have more capacity to deliver critical client
services and are more stable. However, the sources of incubation program revenues
and the ways the incubator uses these resources also are important. This study found
that incubators receiving a larger portion of revenues from rent and service fees
perform better than other programs. On the expenditure side, the more programs
invest in staffing and program delivery—relative to building maintenance or debt
servicing—the higher the probability of improved client outcomes.
Id. at 9.
223 “ARPA almost always requires 50 percent cost-matching for ‘other transactions.’”
Kuyath, supra note 34, at 533. “[T]he 50 percent cost-matching requirement can be a deterrent
to companies participating in government-funded research, particularly if the company is a
nonprofit or small business concern and lacks the financial resources to match costs.” Id.
Accordingly, we recommend the lower percentage successfully required by the Israeli incubator
model.
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funded by regional, state, or federal governments whereas economic
development companies will usually represent the local government.
Any government entity may serve as a future client or supplier for
portfolio firms in the Incubator at prices tied to fair market value.
The following are four additional significant roles that government
can play, as suggested by economists Muro and Katz. 224 First, federal
policymakers can provide Incubator stakeholders around the nation
with information and foundational resources. 225 This implies that the
managers of the Incubators should recruit the involvement of federal
agencies, and, in particular, the following: DOC (particularly, the
National Institute of Standards and Technology); DoD; Education (ED);
Energy (DOE); NASA; and the National Science Foundation (NSF).
Second, at the state level, policymakers should strategically invest
resources in life science clusters and encourage regional collaboration. 226
Regional clusters are defined as “geographic concentrations of
interconnected companies and institutions in a particular field,” which
include “governmental and other institutions.” 227 The state government

MARK MURO & BRUCE KATZ, THE NEW “CLUSTER MOMENT”: HOW REGIONAL
INNOVATION CLUSTERS CAN FOSTER THE NEXT ECONOMY 5 (2010), https://
www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/0921_clusters_muro_katz.pdf
[https://
perma.cc/7DB5-2G53] (“[S]trong clusters foster innovation through dense knowledge flows
and spillovers”). The different government stakeholders should align their efforts horizontally
in addition to “vertically”:
224

The cluster paradigm can—and should—be used to organize the disconnected policy
offerings of any one level of government in service of clusters’ needs in a region, but
it also provides a framework for coordinating them up and down the tiers of
federalism to avoid policy conflict, redundancy, or missed opportunities for synergy.
Id. at 7.
225 Id. at 7–8 (“Going forward, the federal government should move aggressively to build the
information base necessary for cluster activity and policymaking; create effective forums for
best practice sharing; enhance the capacity of regional cluster intermediaries with planning and
other assistance; employ cluster paradigms on major national challenges; coordinate disparate
cluster-relevant programs; and ensure the overarching cluster effort is visibly prominent”).
226 Id. at 8 (“States can make clusters a central component of economic development
planning; target investments strategically to clusters of state significance; and adjust
metropolitan governance to ease regional collaboration”).
227 Michael E. Porter, Clusters and the New Economics of Competition, HARV. BUS. REV.,
Nov.–Dec. 1998, at 77, https://hbr.org/1998/11/clusters-and-the-new-economics-ofcompetition; see also MICHAEL E. PORTER, THE COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE OF NATIONS (1990);
Hal Wolman & Diana Hincapie, Clusters and Cluster-Based Development: A Literature Review
and Policy Discussion 2–3 (Dec. 17, 2010) (unpublished working paper), https://gwipp.gwu.edu/
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should encourage university-industry partnerships to leverage federal
and academic research funds, to build a technically educated workforce,
and to ease regulations to create a more fertile ground for technology.
Third, regional leaders should coordinate all the cluster
participants and identify the various challenges facing clusters in that
region. 228 Finally, local policymakers will need to implement the
strategic cluster-oriented economic development policy, as well as help
gauge the clusters’ effectiveness and their possible expansion. 229 By
working together, federal, regional, and local governments can foster the
creation of ecosystems of excellence. 230
7.

Management

The DHCI requires two sets of managers—a top program manager
(or top management team) 231 for each Incubator and a project manager
(or project management team) for each portfolio company. Both the top
program managers and the top project managers would report to the
steering committee (discussed in the next Section).
a.

Selecting the Top Program Managers for the Incubators

The Incubators could be managed in one of two ways—by internal
executive managers hired to manage the program or by external trusted
partners or intermediaries that contract to perform the top management
function. Regardless of the selection process, the top program managers
of the incubators would be tasked with facilitating the collaboration and
coordination efforts essential for a successful Incubator.

sites/g/files/zaxdzs2181/f/downloads/Working_Paper_042_Clusters.pdf [https://perma.cc/
8M2V-ZJQ6].
228 MURO & KATZ, supra note 224, at 8 (“Regional intermediaries should work to identify
and describe local clusters, identify their binding constraints, and facilitate regional joint action
to implement needed exchanges and initiatives.”).
229 Id. (recommending that local policy makers “should manage zoning and permitting
issues to benefit the physical infrastructure in which clusters exist, and they should keep an eye
out for the broader demographic and social context in which new industry clusters might form
and to which existing ones must adjust”).
230 See text infra accompanying notes 277–87.
231 In this Section we use the terms “top manager,” “executive manager,” and “top
management team” interchangeably unless the context indicates otherwise.
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Selecting Internal Executive Program Managers

The CHIB or an existing agency, such as DARPA, could hire
internal executive program managers for each Incubator. Prospective
executive managers would be required to compete for the right to
participate in the DHCIIs. 232 To the extent that such matters have not
otherwise been specified by the relevant government agency in its
request for OTA proposals, applicants for the position of top program
manager would be expected to address the following in their bids.
First, they should state which industry sectors they believe should
be represented and identify the incubator’s potential clients (that is, the
entrepreneurs and firms that are likely to want to participate in the
program). They should describe the potential clients’ level of
development 233 and evaluate their level of management skills.
Second, they should specify the region they believe is best suited to
physically house the incubator and explain their selection criteria.
Factors to be considered include whether the proposed region is a
technology or non-technology-oriented region; whether it is considered
a central or peripheral geographic area; and what is the industrial
capacity of the region. 234 It is further proposed that the Incubators
232 See Fannie Chen, Note, Structuring Public-Private Partnerships: Implications from the
“Public-Private Investment Program for Legacy Securities”, 46 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 509
(2013) (“[B]uilding a process whereby private parties compete for participation in a [privatepublic partnership] through an auction-like mechanism can help government actors to
accurately gauge the level of private sector risk-aversion ex ante and calibrate the optimal
amount of financial incentive needed to attract private sector participation.”).
233 See About SBIR, supra note 104 (the SBIR guidelines, Phase I definition, and eligibility for
funding provide: “The objective of Phase I is to establish the technical merit, feasibility, and
commercial potential of the proposed R/R&D efforts and to determine the quality of
performance of the small business awardee organization prior to providing further Federal
support in Phase II. SBIR Phase I awards normally do not exceed $150,000 total costs for 6
months.”).
234 See LEWIS, HARPER-ANDERSON & MOLNAR, supra note 76. Lewis et al. found:

Incubator management practices are better predictors of incubator performance than
the size or growth of the region’s employment or GDP. Only the aggregate host
region employment in 2007 was a strong predictor of any incubator outcome—
change in affiliate firm FTE from 2003 to 2008. . . . Compared with incubator quality
variables, regional capacity variables have less predictive power. Among the regional
capacity measures studied, only the proxies for urbanization, work force skills,
availability of locally controlled capital, and higher educational attainment have
moderate influence on incubator client outcomes.
Id. at 9.
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should be sited in ecosystems of excellence that offer affordable and
comfortable housing in order to attract talent.
Third, the applicants should identify the various stakeholders and
potential sponsors (and partners) in the region and explain how they
vary in terms of resources, missions, and requirements.
When selecting the program managers for the Incubators, the
CHIB (or other government agency) should consider the reputation and
experience of the managerial candidates, particularly with regard to the
region in question; the industries (or research) that the agency would
like to promote; the applicant’s experience with seed investments,
developing entrepreneurs and helping them convert their ideas into
viable firms; and the applicant’s ability to marshal additional
investments and resources from local and regional stakeholders. The
vetting and bidding process could also take into account the maximum
amount of capital that the proposed executive program manager (or
management group) would be willing to invest in the Incubator’s
portfolio companies and the equity or executive compensation expected
in return, as well as the size of Incubator that the applicant seeks to
establish.
The program managers will be paid a base salary for the managerial
services that they provide, in addition to a certain equity stake in the
portfolio companies (as equity compensation, in return for a cash
investment in the portfolio company, or both). 235 The percentage of
equity will be determined by the steering committee and will take into
account private industry practice (not public government practice or
wage standards), the region, and the fields of R&D. The Incubators’
program managers will also be subject to the oversight of the private
market, because if the portfolio firms are successful in the future and
complete an acquisition or an initial public offering, then the managers
will be compensated when the value of their equity stake increases.
ii.

Selecting Trusted Partners or Intermediaries to Serve as Top
Program Managers

Alternatively, the federal government could use the relevant
agency’s OTA to contract with trusted partners and third-party
intermediaries. Many of the criteria used for selecting trusted partners
and intermediaries are similar to those applicable to candidates for an
235

See sources cited infra note 264.
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internal executive position. They include expertise vetting potential
projects and ensuring that the cooperation, coordination, exchange of
information, incentives, operational pieces, quality controls, and ethics
and compliance systems necessary for a successful incubator are in
place. Trusted partners and intermediaries will, like internal candidates,
be expected to respond to a request for proposals, but their applications
will not be nearly as extensive as what applicants for internal executive
positions are required to submit. In addition, trusted partners and
intermediaries will not be required to invest any of their own funds.
They would, however, have the option of acquiring an equity stake in a
specific portfolio company on terms acceptable to the project manager
and the steering committee unless such an investment would create
conflicts of interest.
b.

Selection of Project Managers of Portfolio Companies

The process for selecting the project manager for a proposed
portfolio company is extremely important. 236 When entrepreneurs are
applying to join an Incubator, they will be required to provide a detailed
account of their management experience and their perceived need for
hiring others to serve on the top management team for the firm created
to undertake the proposed project. The program manager of the
Incubator for which an entrepreneur is applying will take this
information into account when deciding whether to accept a project.
Under certain circumstances, approval may be conditioned on a
different project manager or an augmented project management team.
c.

Business Plans for the Incubators and Portfolio Company
Operations

Subject to approval by the CHIB (or other authorized government
agency) acting pursuant to its OTA, the top program managers of the
Incubators will be expected to set forth in a business plan or similar
document clear (and well-defined) mission statements, investment
processes, and goals for the Incubator, including a robust schedule of
the fees that will be payable by the portfolio companies for the rental of
236 See LEWIS, HARPER-ANDERSON & MOLNAR, supra note 76, at 9 (“The findings provide
empirical evidence that business incubation best practices are positively correlated to incubator
success. Specifically, practices related to the composition of advisory boards, hiring qualified
staffs that spend sufficient time with clients, and tracking incubator outcomes result in more
successful incubation programs, clients, and graduates.”).

Bagley.Beck.40.2.7 (Do Not Delete)

884

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

1/17/2019 6:14 PM

[Vol. 40:823

facilities and equipment and the provision of other services, such as
hazardous waste removal. The plan should also address the items
required in the applications for executive program managers discussed
above. Ultimately, the Incubator program manager will be expected to
work with the most promising project applicants to help them craft a
brief business plan (or pitch deck) for their proposed project. That
business plan should meld the Incubator’s program plan and the
proposed project description in the participating entrepreneur’s
application into project specifications acceptable to the governing
agency and the steering committee.
Once the government agency and the steering committee approve
the project specifications, it is critical for the Incubator managers to
ensure that the portfolio companies have project managers who are
largely autonomous, as is the case with DARPA projects. Subject to
approval by the steering committee, the top managers of the firms in the
Incubators should have the authority to set goals, supervise staff, and
take other appropriate steps to limit and mitigate the dangers of political
pressures and abuse. 237
The Incubators’ program managers should, however, encourage
the project managers and other stakeholders to promote collaboration
between academic and industry researchers and scientists, given the key
roles institutions of higher learning and research institutes play in a
knowledge economy. 238 These include doing the basic and applied
research necessary to understand various natural and technical
phenomena and thereby contributing to the development of innovative
commercial solutions. Academic partners can also provide guidance to
the businesses fostered by the Incubator and help provide the tacit
knowledge often necessary for successful commercialization. In
addition, academic institutions are often well-suited to addressing the
particular needs of the core industries in the region where the academic

237 See Sean Silverthorne, Government’s Positive Role in Kick-Starting Entrepreneurship,
HARV. BUS. SCH. (Dec. 7, 2009), http://hbswk.hbs.edu/item/6318.html [https://perma.cc/S7RS9SKF].
238 See NATIONAL INNOVATION SYSTEMS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS, supra note 13, at 47–
48; NATIONAL SYSTEMS OF INNOVATION: TOWARD A THEORY OF INNOVATION AND
INTERACTIVE LEARNING 1–2 (Bengt-Åke Lundvall ed., 2010) (discussing the knowledge
economy and noting that a national system of innovation is social and dynamic); SYSTEMS OF
INNOVATION: TECHNOLOGIES, INSTITUTIONS AND ORGANIZATIONS (Charles Edquist ed., 1997);
see also Larédo & Mustar, supra note 85.
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laboratories and other facilities are located. The Incubators’ managers
should also encourage open innovation, 239 shared-use facilities, and
technology transfer from the participating research institutions to firms
capable of converting basic and applied science into marketable
products and services or manufacturing processes.
8.

Steering Committee

Each Incubator will have a steering committee which, according to
the Israeli experience, would typically be chaired by the executive
manager of the Incubator’s management group. 240 The steering
committee should include a technology transfer specialist; an executive
from an incubator graduate firm; 241 accounting, intellectual property
(patent assistance), and general legal experts; 242 representatives from
research institutions and academia; industry representatives; local
government and economic development agency officials; 243 and
representatives from any other stakeholders involved with the
incubator. 244
9.

Key Elements of the Public-Private Partnership Management
Contract

The relationship among the various participants in an Incubator
will typically be memorialized in a public-private partnership
agreement. To increase the likelihood of success, all parties should do
their best to couple a mutual relationship of trust predicated on honesty,
239 Henry Chesbrough, adjunct professor and faculty director of the Center for Corporate
Innovation at the University of California’s Haas School of Business, coined the term “open
innovation.” HENRY CHESBROUGH, OPEN INNOVATION: THE NEW IMPERATIVE FOR CREATING
AND PROFITING FROM TECHNOLOGY xxiv (2005). According to Chesbrough, “Open Innovation
is a paradigm that assumes that firms can and should use external ideas as well as internal ideas,
and internal and external paths to market, as the firms look to advance their technology.” Id.
240 SHEFER & FRENKEL, supra note 157, at 3.
241 LEWIS, HARPER-ANDERSON & MOLNAR, supra note 76, at 7–8.
242 Id.
243 See id. at 8 (stating that local government and economic development officials “play key
roles in enhanced client firm performance, as their presence ensures that the incubator is
embedded in the community, which is necessary for its success. . . . [They] also help educate
critical funding sources about the incubation program and its successes.”).
244 SHEFER & FRENKEL, supra note 157, at 3.
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integrity, transparency, and fair dealing with a long-form contract that
ensures that the proper incentives are in place. 245 Commons theory
posits that private arrangements can be effective to govern shared
resources such as information and data. 246 In this respect, our proposal
incorporates aspects of the work of Nobel Laureate Elinor Ostrom on a
commons framework whereby consortia can share certain data pursuant
to contracts that structure their interactions by taking into account the
knowledge and information resources that they create and exploit. 247
Unlike the nongovernmental governance structure for commons
contemplated by Ostrom, however, our proposal includes aspects of the
Information Commons contemplated by the 21st Century Cures Act,
and it contemplates that the government will be one of the contracting
parties and confer economically efficient intellectual property rights. 248
245 See Bagley & Tvarnø, supra note 16, at 396 (“The prisoners’ dilemma shows that the
parties, acting alone, will self-optimize. A well-crafted and fully enforceable [public-private
partnership] contract can help prevent self-optimization and instead promote joint
optimization and efficient allocation of added value.”).
246 See Katherine J. Strandburg et al., Knowledge Commons and the Road to Medical
Commons, in GOVERNING MEDICAL KNOWLEDGE COMMONS 1 (Katherine J. Strandburg, Brett
M. Frischmann & Michael J. Madison eds., 2017).
247 Nobel Laureate Elinor Ostrom is known for “her analysis of economic governance.”
Kelsey Sharpe, UCLA Alumna Elinor Ostrom Wins 2009 Nobel Prize in Economics, UCLA (Oct.
12, 2009), http://newsroom.ucla.edu/stories/ucla-alumna-elinor-ostrom-wins-111209 [https://
perma.cc/S7ZE-4YD2]. She demonstrated how common property (such as forests, fisheries, or
oil fields) can be successfully managed by the groups using it, without government
intervention. See ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF
INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990); see also Elinor Ostrom & Charlotte Hess, A
Framework for Analyzing the Knowledge Commons, in UNDERSTANDING KNOWLEDGE AS A
COMMONS: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE 41 (Charlotte Hess & Elinor Ostrom eds., 2007). For
more on commons approach, see Michael J. Madison, Brett M. Frischmann & Katherine J.
Strandburg, Constructing Commons in the Cultural Environment, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 657
(2010); Robert P. Merges, Individual Creators in the Cultural Commons, 95 CORNELL L. REV.
793 (2010). See also Elinor Ostrom, The Institutional Analysis and Development Framework and
the Commons, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 807 (2010); Strandburg et al., Knowledge Commons and the
Road to Medical Commons, supra note 246.
248 As Nobel Laureate Paul Romer explained:

If we had a field, a pasture, and we let everybody use it for free, we know what
happens. You get the tragedy of the common pasture. It gets overused. You get
congestion. You get waste[.] But there’s no tragedy of the intellectual commons.
There’s no overuse or congestion from having everybody use an idea once it’s
discovered.
Tiffany Jeung, Paul Romer: How the Economics Nobel Prize Winner Unlocked World
Innovation, INVERSE (Oct. 8, 2018), https://www.inverse.com/article/49702-paul-romer-
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To promote trust and cooperation and reduce the risk of defection,
the contract should include clauses to the following effect:
(1) The parties shall together pursue a strategic alliance by
joint initiatives and optimization for the benefit of the
project. The parties recognize that achieving joint
optimization requires specific legal clauses.
(2) The parties agree to fulfill their obligations in
accordance with the agreed binding clauses setting forth
the common goals and the value added by joint
optimization.
(3) The parties agree to work and conduct research
together in the spirit of the project with openness, trust,
and collaboration.
(4) A copy of the contract shall remain on the table in the
lab. The parties shall use the contract on a daily basis and
educate the involved staff, researchers, and legal back office
in a joint optimization spirit. The parties acknowledge that
the contract is a necessary tool to create added value.
(5) The parties shall take the steps necessary to optimize
the value of the project. Accordingly, all parties have the
obligation to warn each other of any error, omission, or
discrepancy of which they become aware and shall
immediately propose solutions designed to jointly optimize
the successful completion of the project.
(6) It is a requirement that all relevant information be
made available to all parties because it generates
transparency, trust, and confidence. Accordingly, all parties
shall open up their books and calculations concerning the
project.

economics-nobel [https://perma.cc/R6QB-DLS3] (quoting a 2007 interview to EconTalk).
Indeed, “‘[t]he more we know, the easier it gets to discover.’” Hilary Brueck, Economist Paul
Romer Just Won the Nobel Prize in Economics—and His Ideas Sound Like the Backbone of Bill
Gates’ Philanthropy Playbook, BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 8, 2018, 5:42 PM), https://
www.businessinsider.com/paul-romer-nobel-prize-in-economics-endogenous-growth-theory2018-10 [https://perma.cc/GZQ5-Z7RA]. Because a “society never runs out of ideas,” others
“will inevitably leapfrog over the sitting king [holding the patent on an idea], pushing the
boundaries of technology forward while resetting the monopoly. So with more money invested
and more frogs preparing to jump, discovery and economic progress quickens.” Jeung, supra.
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(7) The parties must ensure each other a healthy business
case and optimal research conditions and recognize that
they have different economic yields from the project.
(8) Due to the above clauses, the parties shall establish,
develop, and implement a strategic alliance relationship in
the lab and other shared facilities with the objectives of
achieving:
(a) Mutual cooperation, openness, and trust
(b) Joint research
(c) Common goals
(d) An understanding of each other’s values and the
joint value of the project
(e) Innovation
(f) Improved efficiency and optimization of the
project
(9) Delivery in accordance with Key Performance
Indicators (KPIs) and timetables. Any research, added
value, risk, pain, and gain identified by the parties shall be
subject to incentive payments.
(10) The parties shall investigate all possible positive
incentives to fulfill the value-added transaction. The parties
shall be awarded for and encouraged to maximize their
effort for the benefit of the project and to allocate the added
value in accordance with the key factors in paragraphs (8)
and (9).
(11) Any dispute shall be resolved as soon as possible and
the parties shall apply the following specific strategic
alliance guideline: When a problem arises, the first
responsible director shall gather the parties and, based on
the objectives set forth in the contract, launch a procedure
to solve the problem. If the problem persists, the next
director in the hierarchy shall be given responsibility for
the problem; then, if necessary, a mediator and finally an
arbitrator shall be appointed. At every stage, the above
points shall be observed. All parties recognize that even
when they experience conflict, common goals and
optimization lead to added value for the project. 249
249

Bagley & Tvarnø, supra note 16, at 396–97 (with minor changes in wording).
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Selection and Evaluation of Projects and Portfolio Companies

The Incubator’s management team, including the executive
director and other professional advisors, will propose to the steering
committee one or more (depending on the size and capital of the
Incubator) projects or portfolio companies to participate in the
Incubator. 250 Once the steering committee has approved a project or
portfolio company, the CHIB will be responsible for making the final
decision on which projects and companies will participate in the
program and receive funding. Before making its final determination, the
CHIB will, absent exigent circumstances, be expected to obtain peer
review of the proposals, as happens now with both NIH and IMI grants,
and to request additional advice from independent experts, depending
on the industry and research objectives. 251 To ensure that only truly
innovative projects are approved, regardless of the publishing history or
established reputation of the inventor, we advocate following the
process developed by Thomas Sinkjær, whereby each member of the
review committee is given a “golden ticket” that can be used to greenlight a project even if it is not approved by the other members of the
review committee. 252
To be accepted into the program, the project (business, technical,
or scientific idea) must be innovative, based on sound R&D, and capable
of being commercialized and exported to the appropriate market. The
industry scope is the core activity or common denominator that links

Certain “add-on” contract clauses promote long-term, Pareto optimal collaborations
between pharmaceutical companies and universities in the research discovery phase,
the stage in the value chain at which a strategic alliance can create benefits for both
the university and the pharmaceutical business. For example, positive incentive
clauses ensure that both parties have an incentive to add value for each other. They
create a bigger pie and a more efficient allocation of the slices through the
articulation of common goals, shared value creation, and joint optimization.
Id. at 396; see also Strandburg et al., Knowledge Commons and the Road to Medical Commons,
supra note 246; Strandburg et al., The Knowledge Commons Framework, supra note 246.
250 For a discussion of the Israeli Incubator Model, see SHEFER & FRENKEL, supra note 157.
251 See id. at 3.
252 Thomas Sinkjær, Fund Ideas, Not Pedigree, to Find Fresh Insight, 555 NATURE 143, 143
(2018) (“Anonymous applications free scientists to make bold proposals, and ‘golden tickets’
free reviewers to bet on them.”).
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the participating actors. 253 An Incubator may concentrate on a specific
sector, such as biotechnology or defense needs, but under certain
circumstances the managers might be encouraged to go beyond the
industry scope and support different projects from various industries.
A general objective of the DHCI is to encourage the adoption of
the stakeholder approach to strategic management, 254 which is intended
to give managers a framework within which to deal with constant
changes in the environment, society, technology, and industry. 255
Accordingly, the Incubator managers will be able to actively design a
new direction for the Incubator, 256 as needed to take into account how
the Incubator can affect the environment, in addition to how the
environment may affect the Incubator, 257 subject to the approval of the
steering committee and CHIB.
The managers should be free to select projects that might take a
long time to produce results because they will not be subject to the
threat of losing their jobs if the projects do not produce short-term
results and profits. 258 Such emphasis on investment in long-term R&D

253 See generally THOMAS ANDERSSON ET AL., THE CLUSTER POLICIES WHITEBOOK (2004),
http://www.tci-network.org/uploads/media/CKC/0001/03/245afe2fcf683b3b2fcaf803cabc80795
f2ff0fe.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q53D-2J6Y].
254 See R. Edward Freeman & John McVea, A Stakeholder Approach to Strategic
Management (Darden Graduate Sch. of Bus. Admin., Univ. of Va., Working Paper No. 01-02,
2001),
http://faculty.wwu.edu/dunnc3/rprnts.stakeholderapproach.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
D5NQ-AG6L].

The impetus behind stakeholder management was to try and build a framework that
was responsive to the concerns of managers who were being buffeted by
unprecedented levels of environmental turbulence and change. Traditional strategy
frameworks were neither helping managers develop new strategic directions nor were
they helping them understand how to create new opportunities in the midst of so
much change. As Freeman observed “[O]ur current theories are inconsistent with
both the quantity and kinds of change that are occurring in the business environment
of the [1980s] . . . . A new conceptual framework is needed.” A stakeholder approach
was a response to this challenge.
Id.

255 See id. (“The purpose of stakeholder management was to devise methods to manage the
myriad groups and relationships that resulted in a strategic fashion.”).
256 SHEFER & FRENKEL, supra note 157.
257 See Freeman & McVea, supra note 254.
258 See LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: HOW PUTTING SHAREHOLDERS
FIRST HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC 72 (2012).
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will provide current and future generations with the ability to enjoy the
wealth generated from the innovative projects. 259
Each of the projects in the Incubator program should be evaluated
on a yearly basis. 260 If a project is running over budget or behind
schedule or otherwise not meeting expectations, then the program
manager should give the portfolio company management a reasonable
time to get it back on track. If the program manager or CHIB is still not
satisfied after the portfolio company’s management has been given an
opportunity to meet expectations then either the program manager or
CHIB should have the power to terminate the project, with all
intellectual property rights not already licensed to third parties reverting
to the portfolio company.
11.

Management Incentives to Prevent Adverse Selection, Conflicts of
Interest, Shirking, and Political Capture

To avoid “waste” (i.e., management getting paid by the government
no matter how well the projects do) and political capture (i.e.,
management being pressured by local stakeholders to accept friends,
relatives, or political allies into programs or to otherwise take actions
not in the best interests of the Incubator),261 the following incentives are

259 See Stout, supra note 214, at 707–08. Stout gave examples of the ways in which the results
of research and development by large public corporations have benefited current and future
generations:

IBM and AT&T likely incurred very high levels of “wasteful” agency costs while
operating their Big Blue and Bell Labs research divisions during the 1950s and 1960s.
Nevertheless, those costs have been repaid many times over by the gains to multiple
generations of shareholders (and others) from developing the computer and the
transistor. Similarly, multiple future generations may benefit enormously from
current corporate projects to develop self-driving cars, commercial space transport,
and algal biofuels.
Id.

See generally SHEFER & FRENKEL, supra note 157, at 3.
See Andrei Shleifer, State Versus Private Ownership, 12 J. ECON. PERSPS. 133, 141 (1998)
(arguing that “[g]overnments throughout the world have long directed benefits to their political
supporters, whether in the form of jobs at above-market wages or outright transfers”).
260
261
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designed to encourage the management to be diligent in selecting the
companies that will join the Incubator portfolio. 262
First, the management of the Incubator must be autonomous so it
can set clear and well-defined strategic long-term goals for running the
Incubator. Its duties will include supervising the funding from the
various stakeholder groups, and providing accelerator- and venture
capital-like support services to the portfolio companies, such as assisting
in the development of the R&D and commercialization strategy; helping
to prepare the business plan and the pitch deck; introducing the
entrepreneurs to members of the Incubator management’s network,
including potential mentors, investors, collaborators, and customers;
and providing clerical services, organizational analysis, and legal and
accounting guidance. 263 Additionally, to accelerate the formation and
growth of the seed companies, the management will need to integrate
education and workforce training functions into the Incubator’s
operations, which is where academia and the research community can
also play important roles.
Second, based on lessons learned from the Israeli experience and
following the recent successful market trend of the accelerator model,
the management of the Incubator should be expected to invest a certain
amount of their own capital in the portfolio companies, in cash or as
sweat equity, in return for an equity stake in the companies. 264 Managers
who have invested their own capital in the portfolio Incubator
companies will have a stake in making sure that they do not pick

Capture problems can be reduced by “passing the funds onto intermediaries such as
venture capital funds that make the real investment decisions. By keeping individual awards
relatively modest, they limit efforts to misdirect these funds.” Silverthorne, supra note 237.
263 For an excellent description of the types of support accelerators typically provide and
their effect on start-ups’ success, see Cohen et al., supra note 150. See also MURO & KATZ, supra
note 224, at 7 (“Clustering is a dynamic of the private economy in the presence of public goods.
Cluster strategy should be pursued with humility as a matter of supporting, connecting, filling
gaps, and removing obstacles to private enterprise while making sure certain public and quasipublic goods are available.”).
264 For example, the accelerator program AlphaLab, a nationally-ranked start-up accelerator
program based in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, receives 4% common stock in the companies it
invests in, in return for a $25,000 investment in each company from Innovation Works
(AlphaLab’s parent organization), plus space and services. FAQ, ALPHALAB, http://
alphalab.org/faq (last visited Oct. 6, 2018); see also Cohen et al., supra note 150, at 6
(accelerators typically invest $15,000 to $20,000 in exchange for 6–8% of the new venture’s
equity).
262
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“lemons.” 265 Having an equity stake also reduces the dangers of
management shirking 266 and not acting in the best interests of the
companies and their investors. 267 It may also lessen the effects of
political pressures from the government agencies involved.
12.

Open Innovation and the Creation and Governance of a
Commons

The DHCI is based on the “open-innovation” 268 and “commons”269
paradigms, which enable the participating early-stage firms in the
Incubator to use internal and external ideas to develop their
biotechnology, product, or process, as well as to take advantage of the
shared-use facilities. Firms using open innovation are able to leverage
the basic research that was done by other firms while exploiting both
external and internal sources of innovation, 270 thereby reducing the cost
of carrying out R&D 271 and increasing the likelihood of developing
products or services that would otherwise not exist or would remain
265 See George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market
Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECONOMICS 488, 493 (1970) (discussing the “adverse selection” problem, as
well as firms’ offerings of equity that may be associated with the “lemons” problem); see also
Manuel A. Utset, Reciprocal Fairness, Strategic Behavior & Venture Survival: A Theory of
Venture Capital-Financed Firms, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 45, 56; PAUL A. GOMPERS & JOSH LERNER,
THE VENTURE CAPITAL CYCLE 159 (2d ed. 2004).
266 See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 309 (1976) (“The problem of
inducing an ‘agent’ to behave as if he were maximizing the ‘principal’s’ welfare is quite general.
It exists in all organizations and in all cooperative efforts—at every level of management in
firms, in universities, in mutual companies, in cooperatives, in governmental authorities and
bureaus, in unions, and in relationships normally classified as agency relationships such as are
common in the performing arts and the market for real estate.”).
267 See LERNER, supra note 24, at 7.
268 See CHESBROUGH, supra note 239.
269 See generally Strandburg et al., supra note 246.
270 See Joel West & Scott Gallagher, Patterns of Open Innovation in Open Source Software, in
OPEN INNOVATION: RESEARCHING A NEW PARADIGM 82 (Henry Chesbrough, Wim
Vanhaverbeke & Joel West eds., 2006) (arguing firms produce internal innovations (from
internal knowledge), and various models have been developed in order to try and explain how
firms can also exploit external knowledge). West and Gallagher state there are four sources of
external knowledge: first, supplier and customer; second, university, government, and private
laboratories; third, competitors; and fourth, other nations. Id. at 6 (citing ERIC VON HIPPEL,
THE SOURCES OF INNOVATION (1988)).
271 See CHESBROUGH, supra note 239, at xxiv.
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untapped in the economy. 272 Both open innovation and the creation of
an information commons encourage knowledge spillovers and
collaboration among the participating firms and stakeholders. They can
also facilitate the early incorporation of customers in the development
process 273 and boost the accuracy of customer targeting and market
research. Finally, they increase the potential for viral marketing. 274 Firms
that have successfully used open innovation include Intel, Cisco, and
Microsoft. 275
If, however, there is proprietary information that a private firm will
eventually want to patent or otherwise protect, then a trusted
intermediary may be used to match up promising discoveries and needs
without disclosing the proprietary information to a rival firm or
institution. This is already being done with a high throughput program
whereby promising small molecules or biologics owned by
pharmaceutical and biotech firms are matched against pathogens and
pathways or genes identified by academic scientists pursuant to
cooperative R&D agreements. Alternatively, the OTA contract could
specify that the government is the sole owner of the technology and has
the sole right to use it. If, for example, the government decided to offer a
$1 billion prize to the first firm to successfully develop an antibiotic
effective against “superbugs,” the government would want to keep it as a
drug of last resort to prevent the development of antibiotic-resistant

See also Yoram Margalioth, Not a Panacea for Economic Growth: The Case of Accelerated
Depreciation, 26 VA. TAX REV. 493, 495 (2007); Charles I. Jones, Growth and Ideas, in 1B
HANDBOOK OF ECONOMIC GROWTH 1063, 1065–66 (Philippe Aghion & Steven Durlauf eds.,
2005).
273 According to Marais and Schutte, firms are struggling to find efficient ways to identify
the wants and needs of their target market. Therefore, they should use practical and “realistic”
product testing or prototypes. See STEPHAN MARAIS & CORNE SCHUTTE, THE DEVELOPMENT OF
OPEN INNOVATION MODELS TO ASSIST THE INNOVATION PROCESS 96 (2009).
274 See id. at 105–06; see also Stephan Marais, The Definition and Development of Open
Innovation Models to Assist the Innovation Process 67 (March 2010) (unpublished MScEng
thesis, University of Stellenbosch), http://scholar.sun.ac.za/handle/10019.1/2891 [https://
perma.cc/ARV8-QGLC] (“Idea Bounty puts a lot of emphasis on marketing, not only to retain
existing community members, but also to attract new members. As is the nature of the service
offering, all marketing efforts are done through the use of Web 2.0 technologies—blogs, microblogs and social networking sites.”).
275 See CHESBROUGH, supra note 239, at xxiv.
272
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strains. In such a case, the drug might be manufactured by a large
pharmaceutical firm but the government would be the sole customer. 276
13.

Ecosystems of Excellence

If our initiative is properly implemented, it should lead to the
formation of “ecosystems of excellence,”277 sometimes called
“clusters,” 278 with the following positive results. First, it can foster
geographic connections between the various regions where the
Incubators are located. 279 Second, it can boost new enterprise
formation 280 and help firms survive the Valley of Death 281 by stimulating
276 Thanks to Jo Handelsman, the Howard Hughes Medical Institute Professor and the
Frederick Phineas Rose Professor of Molecular, Cellular, and Developmental Biology at Yale
University, and the former Associate Director for Science, the White House Office of Science
and Technology Policy during the Obama administration, for this example.
277 See Teece, supra note 24, at 104; see also Cohen, supra note 141; supra note 141 and
accompanying text. An example of an ecosystem of excellence is the Cyber Center of Excellence
in San Diego, California. It is “a non-profit dedicated to accelerating the region’s cyber
economy and positioning it as a global hub of cyber innovation.” CYBER CTR. OF EXCELLENCE,
ANNUAL REPORT: 2017 (2018), https://sdccoe.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/CCOE_2017Annual-Report_DIGITAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/4QQ5-CMHK]. “The ecosystem includes
incubators, financiers, experienced service providers and non-profits that support more than
100 firms focused exclusively on cybersecurity. In addition, the proximity of research and
development facilities to Northern Mexico’s manufacturing hub allows for the development of
quick-to-market products.” CYBER CTR. OF EXCELLENCE, ACCELERATING THE CYBER
INNOVATION ECONOMY 2 (2016), https://sdccoe.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/CCOE_
Brochure_v5.2.pdf [https://perma.cc/7P6Y -7MKB]. Multiple universities and colleges in the
region engage in cutting-edge research in cybersecurity and train students for careers in
cybersecurity, computer science, and engineering. Id. The Navy’s Space & Naval Warfare
Systems Command is based in San Diego, and it awards more than $1.1 billion in privateindustry contracts annually to companies in the San Diego region, making its presence “a huge
contributing factor for many companies to locate and stay in the region.” Id. See generally
CYBER CTR. EXCELLENCE, https://sdccoe.org [https://perma.cc/KMB8-KANZ] (last visited Oct.
4, 2018).
278 PORTER, supra note 227 (approximately twenty years ago, Michael Porter, a Harvard
Business School professor, introduced and popularized the concept of “clusters”); see also supra
text accompanying notes 248–53.
279 See generally PAUL R. KRUGMAN, GEOGRAPHY AND TRADE (1993) (discussing the
significance of geographical economics).
280 PORTER, supra note 227.
281 Id. See discussion on Valley of Death supra Part II. These small and young firms are often
more open to a commons framework whereby consortia can share certain data pursuant to
contracts that structure their interactions by taking into account the knowledge and
information resources that they create and exploit. These new ideas also tend to have a greater
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low-cost collaboration between early-stage companies and various
stakeholders, including customers, employees, creditors, suppliers, and
other non-shareholder groups, which will supply the enterprise with
resources (such as funding, labor, expertise, infrastructure, and the
like). 282 Third, it can foster innovation and commercialization through
dense knowledge flows and spillovers, including networking, data
gathering, and sharing. 283 Finally, it can foster competition and
encourage firms to innovate. 284
CHIB should be in charge of developing platforms that will allow
the various Incubator program managers to meet; share their progress,
difficulty, and achievements; and share their resources, so that they can
create a public-private “National Network for Innovation Incubation” to
successfully deal with natural or terror events in the future. During
previous events of this sort, there were deficiencies in both the local
public health response and the federal government’s ability to manage
it. 285 For example, in 2001, respondents complained that “they did not
have all the necessary agreements in place to put the plans into
operation rapidly,” ran into trouble reaching clinicians to provide them
with guidance, and had not anticipated the number of entities with
which they would have to communicate. 286
We note that there is controversy concerning the issue of whether
foreign companies or entrepreneurs should be able to participate in
programs funded by American taxpayers. However, in today’s global
chance of making their way into practice due to the greater flexibility and more direct exchange
of ideas among the various levels of the managerial hierarchy in smaller firms. Therefore, our
initiative incorporates aspects of the work of Nobel Laureate Elinor Ostrom on the commons.
282 See Stout, supra note 214, at 692 (definition of “stakeholders”).
283 See MURO & KATZ, supra note 224, at 5. Because cluster entities share an industrial focus,
they tend to be in an excellent position to make use of knowledge and innovation relevant to an
industry. PORTER, supra note 227. Absent the cluster, individual companies would lack access
to certain information, such as market research and supply chain analysis. Id.
284 See MURO & KATZ, supra note 224, at 5; PORTER, supra note 227; see also Harald Bathelt
et al., Clusters and Knowledge: Local Buzz, Global Pipelines and the Process of Knowledge
Creation, 28 PROGRESS HUM. GEOGRAPHY 31, 36–37 (2004) (clusters strongly encourage and
pressure companies to innovate both to stay competitive and to increase profitability).
285 See Temko, supra note 108, at 2–3, 6. For past example of failure to deal with the Anthrax
incidents of 2001, see U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-04-152, BIOTERRORISM: PUBLIC
HEALTH RESPONSE TO ANTHRAX INCIDENTS OF 2001 (2003) [hereinafter BIOTERRORISM: PUBLIC
HEALTH RESPONSE TO ANTHRAX INCIDENTS OF 2001].
286 BIOTERRORISM: PUBLIC HEALTH RESPONSE TO ANTHRAX INCIDENTS OF 2001, supra note
285, at 1.
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economy, such collaborations are necessary and even inevitable.287
Therefore, international firms should be able to participate (as partners
of American firms) unless their involvement would pose a threat to
national security.
IV. CHALLENGES AND SOLUTIONS
There are many challenges associated with introducing change into
an existing organization, especially a massive bureaucratic organization
like the U.S. government or a complex system such as the patchwork of
physicians, nurses, researchers, hospitals, clinics, insurers, and others
responsible for the provision of healthcare in the United States. 288
A.

Reluctance to Deal with the Government

Individuals and companies in the private sector are often reluctant
to sell to and collaborate with the government. 289 Reasons include the
federal government’s inflexible fight for control over intellectual
property rights and software warranties; 290 unreasonable, timeconsuming, and very costly delays in funding due to such things as shifts
in government priorities and changing strategies and procurement
needs; 291 complex cost accounting requirements; and the “long, onerous
and costly federal acquisition process.”292 According to one GAO report
that compared the process of submitting proposals for sale to the
government with submitting bids to private parties, it took one
company twenty-five full-time employees, twelve months, and millions
of dollars to prepare a bid for the government. 293 In contrast, it took
only three part-time employees, two months, and thousands of dollars
to prepare the same bid for a private firm.

287 See discussion supra Section III.B.5 (discussing cross-regional collaboration with respect
to the Israeli Incubator programs.
288 See Dorothy Leonard-Barton & William A. Kraus, Implementing New Technology, HARV.
BUS. REV., Nov. 1985, at 102.
289 See Cooke, supra note 50.
290 Id.
291 Id.
292 Id.
293 Id.
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There are also cultural differences between the private industry,
business, and government in general and with respect to public health in
particular. There is a lack of familiarity with one another’s values,
metrics, resources, constraints, lines of accountability, management
styles, lingo, and modes of operation. Private parties often view
government management styles as inefficient and wasteful.
Entrepreneurs and business leaders are concerned about the need to
follow misinformed or opaque government regulations. Public leaders
in the public health area may see their role as constraining businesses
from promoting unhealthy products, harming the environment, or
threatening the health of workers and patients—not as taking risks to
find new therapies or finding ways to fund all the compounds and
biologics that never find their way to a patient.
But there is precedent for the public-private partnerships we
propose, including the Manhattan Project and DARPA. The surprise
attack by the Japanese on Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, gave birth to the field of
operations research as the country scrambled to arm and clothe its
soldiers and build fleets of ships, submarines, tanks, and aircraft. Given
the threats posed by CBRN attacks and diseases like influenza, we call
on President Trump to order a review by operations research experts of
how the FDA assesses and approves new drugs and medical devices.
Queuing theory suggests that backlogs can be reduced by incremental
increases in resources. The markets have already signaled what
expedited FDA approval is worth; major pharmaceutical firms, which
are often seeking approval of a “me-too drug” (one that is only slightly
different from other drugs on the market), have paid hundreds of
millions of dollars to acquire the transferable fast-track vouchers
provided to the developers of cures for orphan diseases. 294
We applaud the FDA’s willingness to consider accepting
aggregated patient data, of the sort gathered by Flatiron Health, based
on electronic health records to be used in lieu of expensive and timeconsuming clinical trials. 295 This may be particularly appropriate when a
294 Ana Santos Rutschman, The Priority Review Voucher Program at the FDA: From
Neglected Tropical Diseases to the 21st Century Cures Act, 26 ANNALS HEALTH L. 71 (2017).
Government prizes can also spur otherwise unprofitable private-sector innovation. See
generally Michael J. Burstein & Fiona E. Murray, Innovation Prizes in Practice and Theory, 29
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 401 (2016).
295 Lydia Ramsey, The FDA and a $1.2 Billion Startup Are Analyzing How Drugs Are Used
After Approval—and it Could One Day Change How We Treat Cancer, BUS. INSIDER (June 2,
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drug already approved for one clinical use is being considered for
another (so-called repurposing).
B.

Lack of a Unified Healthcare Infrastructure

Some (including certain members of Congress) maintain that the
first BioShield initiative failed because the enabling act did not address
the United States’ healthcare infrastructure problems. Our DCHI
ameliorates this by calling for centralized collaboration and
coordination between and among local, state, and federal authorities,
universities and research institutes, public and private hospitals and
medical centers, private industry, and nongovernmental organizations
for the purpose of defending U.S. residents from CBRN attacks and
naturally occurring diseases like antibiotic-resistant bacteria. Given the
gravity and widespread nature of such threats, our hope is that our
modest proposal will be able to withstand the partisan politics that have
resulted in the partial dismemberment of the Affordable Care Act. 296
C.

Uncertainty, High-Risk, and Asymmetric Information Barriers

Uncertainty, high-risk, and asymmetric information barriers are
associated with investing in early-stage pharmaceutical, medical device,
and biotech firms. 297 The markets for allocating risk capital to early
stage ventures are inefficient. 298 Private investors often cannot obtain
adequate information about which inventions and companies are likely
to succeed. It is particularly difficult to quantify market uncertainties
when an innovation is radical and technologies and markets are
constantly evolving, changing, and becoming ever more complex. Even
venture capital investors, who are special financial intermediaries that
have found a way to address at least some of these information
challenges, have abandoned early-stage biotech investments in favor of

2017, 10:24 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/flatiron-health-collaboration-with-fda-dataat-asco-2017-6 [https://perma.cc/63MG-7TPM].
296 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010).
297 See BRANSCOMB & AUERSWALD, supra note 94, at 5–6.
298 See id.
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later stage investments, 299 in part because they cannot capture the full
benefits of such technologies. 300 Additionally, many large public firms
are closing or relocating their R&D labs to sites outside of the United
States, and are shying away from “Moon Shot” investments in R&D
initiatives with uncertain returns. 301
The DHCI is designed to address many of these challenges by
having the government intervene in the market, as it did after the Soviet
Union launched Sputnik, by creating DARPA and giving it OTA to
harness the power of the private sector and the university research
community. Providing seed capital for public-private incubators that
together form an ecosystem of excellence reduces at least some of the
financial inefficiencies and helps bridge information gaps associated
with investment in R&D. Perhaps, most importantly, it will serve as a
catalyst for encouraging and stimulating the private development of
innovative solutions (including funding early-stage companies) as
happened with the Israeli Technology Incubator program.
D.

Political Capture of Business Objectives

A primary argument for the privatization of state-owned firms or
state-financed ventures has been the political capture of business
purposes and objectives. Politicians concerned with being re-elected
have a strong personal interest in making their constituents happy.
Therefore, they have a tendency to push for more recruitment than
299 Joseph A. McCahery et al., Corporate Venture Capital: From Venturing to Partnering, in
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF VENTURE CAPITAL 211 (Douglas Cumming ed., 2012), http://
www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195391596.001.0001/oxfordhb9780195391596-e-7.
300 See, e.g., Bronwyn H. Hall, The Private and Social Returns to Research and Development,
in TECHNOLOGY, R&D, AND THE ECONOMY 140 (Bruce L.R. Smith & Claude E. Barfield eds.,
1996) (providing evidence that the social return to R&D is much above the private return); see
Zvi Griliches, The Search for R&D Spillovers, 94 SCANDINAVIAN J. ECON. S29, S29–36 (1992)
(evaluating calculations of the social rates of return for research and development); Margalioth,
supra note 272, at 501, 512–13; BRANSCOMB & AUERSWALD, supra note 94, at 2–6.
301 This is due in part to ill-informed notions of “shareholder primacy,” which can deter
large public companies from embarking on long-term strategic projects with uncertain returns.
See generally STOUT, supra note 258. Managers may abstain from investing in risky innovation
if they are under a constant threat of losing their jobs due to a change in both ownership and
management. Id.; see also Andrei Shleifer & Lawrence H. Summers, Breach of Trust in Hostile
Takeovers, in CORPORATE TAKEOVERS: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 33, 33–56 (Alan J.
Auerbach ed., 1998), https://www.nber.org/chapters/c2052.pdf [https://perma.cc/49GR-GFQE].
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necessary in order to create jobs and spend more (in excess) than the
private market would on an initiative, 302 such as construction of a new
public university campus. Moreover, politicians can also push for
initiatives, projects, and corporations that will essentially be tools to
transfer wealth to their supporters, partners, or relatives. 303 This results
in the misallocation of scarce government resources to the detriment of
the taxpayer, as well as to those who would be better served by a more
efficient process for funding innovation. 304 Moreover, governments can
elect to pay higher wages to government workers than are customary in
the private market, which often surpass the public worker’s productivity
level. 305
We seek to address the risk of political capture by calling for largely
independent and autonomous incubator management teams who have
their own funds or sweat equity invested in the projects or portfolio
companies being provided seed capital by the government. In addition,
by following the successful Israeli example and requiring that at least
15% of the necessary funding be provided by nongovernment sources,
our proposal provides a form of market check on the choice of
investments.
CONCLUSION
This Article calls on the U.S. government to enact policies for
institutional innovation that will encourage public and private sector
experimentation and collaboration by reducing bureaucracy and
promoting sustainable relationships and open innovation, while
preserving the possibility of obtaining the intellectual property rights
that are usually required to give private industry the incentive to
innovate and commercialize novel therapeutics and medical devices.
Properly harnessing the resources of private industry, universities and
research centers, and government, will, we submit, lead not only to
See Belloc, supra note 83, at 9–11.
See id.
304 See Shleifer, supra note 261, at 148, 142 (arguing for the “importance of ownership as the
source of capitalist incentives to innovate” and that “state firms are inefficient not just because
their managers have weak incentives to reduce costs, but because inefficiency is the result of the
government’s deliberate policy to transfer resources to supporters”).
305 Giacomo Corneo & Rafael Rob, Working in Public and Private Firms, 87 J. PUB. ECON.
1335 (2003).
302
303
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improved readiness to respond to CBRN attacks and epidemics, but also
to improvements in societal health and overall well-being.
In particular, we propose that Congress and the president enact
and implement the Defense of Health Countermeasures Initiative, a
multi-prong program that builds on the successes of DARPA and on the
Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority, including
their use of the federal government’s Other Transaction Authority to
create a national network of public-private incubators governed by
contracts 306 of the sort currently used by participants in the European
Union’s Innovative Medicines Initiative 307 and by certain U.S. inventors,
universities and research institutes, and for-profit firms working
together with the NIH and other government funders under the BayhDole Act. 308 Our initiative incorporates aspects of the work of Elinor
Ostrom on a commons framework, whereby consortia can share certain
data pursuant to contracts that structure their interactions by taking
into account the knowledge and information resources that they create
and exploit. 309 However, unlike the nongovernmental governance
structure for commons contemplated by Ostrom, our proposal includes
aspects of the Information Commons contemplated by the 21st Century
Cures Act, CARB-X, and DRIVe. To provide adequate incentives for
private firms to participate, members of a consortium will have the
ability to keep certain information and downstream inventions
proprietary, by allocating the patent rights by contract, as contemplated
by Nobel Laureate Paul Romer, or by disclosing them only to a trusted
intermediary pursuant to a confidentiality agreement that preserves
future patentability and licensing rights.
We assert that the DHCI will not only help to protect U.S. residents
from CBRN attacks and naturally occurring deadly diseases, but will
also promote economic growth and increase productivity by ensuring
See Bagley & Tvarnø, supra note 14.
See id. at 400–01; Gaspar et al., supra note 21, at 984–86; see also How IMI Works, supra
note 21. IMI works to “improve health by speeding up the development of innovative
medicines, particularly in areas where there is an unmet medical or social, public health need.”
Id. IMI facilitates “collaboration between the key players involved in healthcare research,
including universities, the pharmaceutical and other industries, small and medium-sized
enterprises (SMEs), patient organisations, and medicines regulators.” Id.
308 For a list of legislation concerning innovation, see Block, supra note 34, at 179–80; see
also Alon-Beck, supra note 23, at 284 n.78.
309 See Strandburg et al., Knowledge Commons and the Road to Medical Commons, supra
note 246, at 1–5; Strandburg et al., The Knowledge Commons Framework, supra note 246.
306
307
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that U.S. biotechnology start-ups can successfully compete in
tomorrow’s marketplace. 310 We recognize that even this modest
proposal will require policymakers to design and institute sweeping
innovation policies that will embrace new approaches to management,
technologies, and operating methods. 311 Input and assistance from
experts in academia, industry, and government will be needed to turn
this skeletal proposal into the legislation, regulations, and contracts
necessary to give our proposal life. Areas for further research and
reflection include, but are not limited to: the application of the
competition laws in the United States and the European Union to the
partnerships, consortia, and networks we propose; government
appropriations;
interagency
coordination;
countermeasure
prioritization; bilateral and multilateral opportunities for cooperation;
the pricing mechanisms for inventions and equity funded through the
DHCI; the appropriate use of government prizes and vouchers to spur
innovation; 312 and the provisions necessary to protect basic human
rights, especially the right to privacy. At the risk of sounding grandiose,
we hope that this Article will help further the dialogues and work
necessary to effect real change.

See Porter & Kramer, supra note 69, at 4–6, 12.
Block, supra note 34; see also Mary J. Dent, A Rose by Any Other Name: How Labels Get
in the Way of U.S. Innovation Policy, 8 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 128, 130–31 (2011) (stating that
“policies that affect the innovation sector are frequently adopted as part of broader packages
that have nothing to do with innovation”); Porter & Kramer, supra note 69, at 4–5, 7; KENT H.
HUGHES, BUILDING THE NEXT AMERICAN CENTURY: THE PAST AND FUTURE OF AMERICAN
ECONOMIC COMPETITIVENESS 1–2 (2005).
312 See Burstein & Murray, supra note 294; see also Rutschman, supra note 294.
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